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People around the world said at one time that the physical sun 
rises in the sky from the East, but the light of reason rises from the 
West. Thus the Orient was excluded from a position in the history of 
.1 
philosophy. Even so, an inevitable dialogue between the East and the 
I 
West has been de~eloping for the. past several years, especially in the 
philosophical sense. 
The Orient long has been known as a ~reat market for commerical 
and political dealings. Nevertheless, not all exchanges of goods and .. 
'services are successful~ Th:irigs which appeal to the Weatern salesmen 
do not always app,eal to the Orient~l buyer~ And in .philosophy, there 
is indeed a tendency to assume that the "categoriesof thqught" are 
different in East and West. In one sense, the Orient ie more' con-
sciously philosophical or non-practibal than ,the West. That is to say 
it is usual in Oriental countries for life to ,be governed by conscious 
reference to general principles of philosophJ'.", of religion. The_se gene-
ral principles find their way very ~aturally into conver1;3.ation. In 
Oriental' countries social life.'is. based on the religious foundation. 
Life in the society cannot be separated from the religion. To many a 
Wester:n mind, this is an ~Gldity • 
. , 
Weste,rn philosophy, on the other ·hand:, tries to arrive at solu-
tions through the rational or scientific method. Pe·ople · in the West 
1 
2 
emphasize intellectual abil}ties in man, so thE!Y possibly do not agree 
'-•. I ! 
that there is a certain connection with the Wholly Other.beyond man-
kind's scope' of activities. 
In the case of Chinese phflosophers, what is true of science is 
also true of im~taphysics ~d of ethics. The gr6und of science can be 
. .;. 
found in the philosopil:icail theory of metaphysic's. By 'studying the 
theory of metaphysics, the Orien{' tries to fulfill the purpose,s for the 
economical life. 
Sotne of us might raise the question: how can a dialogue between 
East and Wes.t be possib:)..e? In the West, the problem of metaphysics is 
j 
already excluded from the stream of :philo13ophy because of the influence 
df science. On the co~trary,, · in neither India nor China is truth lo-
cated in the mental intellect. The Indian and c.hinese sages insisted 
on the vecy opposite: name1y, that man does not atta'in iio truth so 
long as he remains lodkect. up in his intellect. In order to show how 
. . 
a dialogue between East and West is possible, I have chosen one'meta-
physical issue: the notion of Nothingness. In contemporary- Western 
I . 
. . 
philosbphy, the importance of metaphysics haf! been found again in 
Martin Heidegge!'',s work, as ~e say~, "in our times we deem it progres-
l • . ..1 · M 1 si ve to give our approval to · 'metaphysics' again. • • • an;y peop e 
have begun finally to ·recognize the mysterious .relations with.the 
2 East. 
. ! ' 
. . ' 
Tnough Heidegger makes a few references to these bridges,· w:e, 
\ .. \ 
in discussing his thought, cannot fail to refer to them. 
': 
Heidegger attempted sometimes to listen to the Oriental world 
I -1 .. -
through a dialogue on language between a Japanese scholar and himself .. 
as an Inquirer. 3 Even if nobody ~ows his own motive, Heidegger, with 
the Oriental influence, studiedParmenides and Heracleitos and brought 
3 
himself to realize that what they were asking about was a being in re-
lation to particular objects and not Being qua Being. So he tried to 
find the ground for Being qua Being in the possibility of Being (Sein)4. 
The possibility of the history of Being (Seingeschichte) indicates the 
possibility of true philosophy, apart from the contemporary Western 
thought. Heidegger says, 
\ 
philosophy is haunted by the fear of losing prestige and va-
lidity, unless it becomes science •••• Being as the element of 
thought has been abandoned in the technical interpretation of 
thought.5 
His pursuit of the history of Being made him listen to the Oriental 
experience which was uncomprehensible in the Western discursive thought. 
According to William Barrett, 
Western metaphysics before Heidegger had never thought out 
the nature of non-Being, but Chinese Taoism accepts cheer-
fully the necessary complementarity of Being and non-
B . 6 eing ••• 
It is not easy in Western thought to understand the experience 
out of which Eastern philosophies grew. Oriental philosophy is ubiq-
uitous. The implementation of Oriental philosophies takes place even 
in the abstract branches of logic, but it is most conspicuous in meta-
physics, ethics, and the foundation of social life. It has no philoso-
phy and no religion which is not at work. Its reflections are kept in 
close connection with actions. Whatever is done in Oriental society is 
related to Being as the Wholly Other beyond mankind's scope of activi-
ties, yet such Being still gives a character to those activities. Peo~ 
ple in Oriental society work to find the meaning or the ground for their 
lives through Being. 
That is why; whosoever is remote from the experience of Being and 
non-Being will recoil from it with a scandalized cry of Nihilism. That 
4 
is to say, they could misunderstand th~ notion of Nothingness.7 Who-
soever does not };lave the experience of Nothingness, remembers only the 
word "nothingness." Because of the impression of the word itself, it 
is possible to interpret the Nothingness as Helmut Kuhn does.· He sa!Y"s, 
••• as an encdunter. with 'Nothingness I, that is, the privation 
of' meaning ~d reality, whereas, .in :truth, it seems to me that 
it is t~e. incomprehensi ~l~ fullne.ss of meaning ~d reality •••• 
But arriving there they· find the place empty ••• 
But Kuhn might be mis~derstanding the notion of Nothingness. 
In: Heidlegg~r1, .the notion of Nothingness is no't a counter-concept 
. ,. I I, 
I ' 
to Being. Heidegger, therefore, .should. not be called nihilistic. 
i 
The thought of Lao-Tzu greatly traµscends the mundane world, also; 
.. ' 
for instance, <h:is strohg attack on social and political ins ti tut ions. · 
In fact, depth in·the principle ~f Tao (Nothingness)· in·Lao-Tzu does 
:; ' I 
not emphasize the d•;mial of marital' activities in man, nei'ther does it. 
manifest the charaqt~ristic of nihilism or the scorning of actual so:.. 
ciety. Its principle is to rediscover the gr~at principles dir~ct'ing 
the universe as well as h'q.man affairs by emphasizing the transqendence 
' I 
of Nothingness, itself and th~ waiver of rational needs in man. 
Martin Heidegger ie a contemporary Existentialist thinker, 9 and 
Lao-Tzu was an ancient: Chinese philosopher. 10 There will be .differ-
ences in place and time between Heidegger and Lao-Tzu, but their cen-
'· 
tral points seem to be simpar to each other; the experience of Noth- · 
' ' 
ingness beyond the scope of intellectual abilities. In order to solve 
the question of Being, Heidegger .first atte,mpts to de~c:z:ibe Seiende (or 
Dasein, Being-in-the-World), while Lao-Tzu first defines ,the character 
of Tao itself and then deals with beings in the woril.d. 
The purposes of this essa;y are: to examine how Heidegger and 
5 
·, 
Lao-Tzu define the same subject-matt~r, and, to.illustrate how their 
solutions, arrived at from differen~ starting-points, are similar. 
However, because even in their 'same fundamental Being-questions, dif...,. 
: . . 
I 
ferent expressions for the solution to these questions exist, I will· 
. I ' 
' .al~o try to find the bridge of dialogue by which a world of synthenti-
cal harmony can be established between Lao-Tzu and Heidegger. 
I 
I might be asked: why do, you want to· increase the philosophical 
dialogue betwee'n East and West, e1specially through the notion of Noth- · 
ingness? Why is it necessary to have experienced the nothingness? 
~ome peoj;>le say, "We have nothing to do. 11 Because of the expression, 
"nothing to do," they have been losing the meaning of their life. Ac-
tually they are misunqlerstariding the expresston, "nothing to do." The 
positive aspects contained in the term "nothing to do" must be dis-
covered through the experience of Nothingness.· It must be known that 
the experience of Nothingness is not only the way to rnak~ us find 'our 
real selves but also t~e way to tell us what to do in different con-
I 
texts. In a technological society, many people in the East and the i\· ... .. 
West become alienated by losing. 'the direct;i.on of life. I think they 
have to understand the expression, "nothing to do." Fortunately there 
I 
are, at least, two philosophers who can each contribute something to 
' the understanding of the no'tion of Nothingness. 
I hope that the true understanding of the notion of Nothingness 
can be found through this essay in order to restore the direct.ion of 
life. 
Before proceeding with the main proplem, there might be' central 
questions raised that require our consideration. In their (Heidegger 
and Lao-Tzu) philosophical endeavours, do they ever directly -.share a 
6 
common perspective? Does the main concern of each define a common 
problem? The answer is probably "No. 11 :But how can I show significant 
common grounds of dialogue between them? This is the question concern-
ing us. 
As far as their positions regarding the main problem are concerned, 
some significant common grounds will affo;rd us sufficient possibility 
for- dfalogue between Heideggell andi:;Lao~Tzu~ .Th1=1 meanings intended in 
the concept of Not•hi'ng.ness . are especially able to serve as a basic 
I I 
bri!dge between the East and the West. :By thfs comparison I hope.to 
·, 
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7 
CHAPTER II 
THE BASIC QUESTION OF PHILOSOPHY: 
HEIDEGGER AND LAO-TZU 
In Western philosophy, an epoch-making era of studying Being has 
. 
resulted from the work of Karl Jaspers and Martin Heidegger, in spite 
of the fact that an access to ontology was attempted,before. In 
·, 
Jaspers and Heidegger metaphysics turned itself back to its preemi-
nent position in philosophy for·the first time since metaphysics had 
been considered by philosophers after Thales. 
Many philosophers (e:J1:cept logical posi_tivists) in the West have 
been increasing their attention to the central concept of traditional 
metaphysics--being or substance. Although today 1 s concern about it in 
philosophy includes m~ aspects, one of the basic sources for the 
problem is Aristotle's metaphysics. Aristotle dealt with the concept 
of substance and with being qua being and its essential attributes. 
It seems to me that Aristotle intended his propo~i tion, 11 a'11 'men 
by nature desire to know," to tell us to be aware of men.' s ignorance 
about the leading principle or teleological cause or the grounding 
Ground of beings ("beings" is d'istinot from Being). He says, 
Now if natural substances are the first of e~isting things, 
physics must be the first of science, but if there is anoth~r 
entity and substance, separable and unmovable,·the knowledge 
of it must be different'and prior to physics·and universal 
because it is prior.l 
According to Aristotle, then, our desire to know is not satisfied in 
8 
9 
knowing the characters and functions of an object, but in seeking the 
u],timate principle of all things, for all things n~ed an ultimate cause 
in order·to move, to be ordered, ~nd to receive their existence. 
Aristotle conc~ntrates on the doctrine of Being, and does not make 
Non-Being a theme for his thought. Nevertheless, in any doctrine of· 
Being, a doctrin~ of Non-Being is implieq,. Strictly spe~king, it is 
nbt correct that Western metaphysicians before Heidegger had never 
i 
thought out the nature of non-Being •. Only they thought of the nature 
of the ultimate principle both cosmologieally as being in relation to 
entities, and logically as the nature of being opposed to rion-bei11g. 
According to a Greek thinker, Parmenides, 
The narrower bands were filled with the unmixed fire, and 
those next to them w±th night, and in the mid.st of these 
rushes their portiori of fi:r,e. In the midst of these is 
the divinity that directs the course of all .things; fbr 
he is the beginner of all painful.· birth and all· begetting, 
deri vi~ the female• to embrace •'the male, and male the 
femal'eo 
I.n this passage, 'it is· not, difficult to find Parmenides' position 
postulating a divinity that directs the course of all things. The di-
vinity can be identical with Being, the ultimate principle or the or-
de ring power of all things·. 
The ultimate principle was described in more detail by Aristotle. 
' 
Metaphysics in the .A:ristotelian sense is definable as a science which 
inve~tiga.tes the nature of being qua bEring, 'that is, substance. In 
Plato, substance was the universal; the form which he a'ssumed to re-
' 
side in a world apartr the eternal and transcendent world of ideas, 
but Aristotle regards the particular obje'cts or individual beings as 
real substances. Every individual substance consists of matter and 
form. By form Aristotle understands the universal aspect of a thing, 
the essential un;i.ty shared by all things of the same type; matter is 
that which confers particularity and uniqueness. On this point, 
Aristotle asserts that the universal ar1id the particular are composed 
into the complete unity of the individual. The individual object 
changes.! How shall we explain this process of changing? There must 
10 
be something underlying change, something that persists in the change, 
something to which the different qualities pertain~ • Aristotle s.ays, • 
It follows, then, that 1 ~ubstance 1 has two se~ses, (a) the 
ultimate substratum, which is no longer predicated of any-
thing else, and (b) that which, being a this, is also 
separable-~and of this nature is the shape or form of each 
thing.3 . 
By this statement "substance" means something which is capable of in-
dependent existence. 
Aristotle says in the Categories, 
Everything except primary substance is either predicated of 
primary substances or is present in them, and if these last 
did not exi!'3t~ i't would be impossible for anything else to 
existo4 
In the above statement 1 Aristotle puts forward not only the connection 
between a primary su·bstance and secondary substance, but also the no-
tion of a persistent entity ba~ed on the priority of a primary sub-
stance to everything elseo Priority 9 with respect to nature and sub-
stance, is something which can be without o~her things, while the 
others can not be without them.5 Aristotle is not satisfied in defin-
ing substance as attributes. So he tries to find something underlying 
attributes. Aristotle tries to locate the notion of a persistent en-
tity in the concept of form as substance. 
Because of the above conditions, Aristotle says, 
As the substratum and the essence and the compo-gnd of these 
are called. substance, so al so is the uni versaL 
11 
Here .Aristotle describes substantia1ity as so111:ething involving bo~h 
the essence and the stlbstratum. Among PO!j!sible characterizations of 
substance (Q!u. 4 a~·lO, Meta. 1029 a, 8), Aristotle's favorit~ ac-
count of substance is that of substance as essence, cl} corl of essential ' 
properties. 
Aristotle seems to intend to assert that the ultimate substratum 
must have its qualities in such· a wa;y that it must ·.be other than the 
I 
sum of its qualities. He posi:ts1 the U:l tima te principle. 
The traditional concept of "Being" in the West, according to 
Heidegger, is the universal, as was also realized.by Aristotle, Thomas, 
' ' 
' . 
and Hegel ,(however, Th<l\mas and Hegel will not be dealt with in this 
paper); its universality goes beyond that of any genus. At the same 
time it is obscure and indefinable. 
I 
In·'contrast to the tradition, the main point of He:iidegger' s meta-
physics is not to seek to determine whether or not being exists, how 
being exists,· but· to observe Beirig qua Being as what it is. In.-,Bei!lfi 
~ ~v Heidegger says, 
The Being of entities vis' ,not itself an entity. If-. we are 
to understand the problem of Being, our first philosophical 
step consists in not o •• def,ining enti ties 9 ••• as if Being had 
the character of some possible entity.7 
In order to elucidate·the meaning of Being, Heidegger raised anew the 
question of the meaning of Being, and also began opening the horizon 
for Being in' iitself. He says that "we mus~. first work out an adequate 
I ' 
way .2f. formulating ll•"~, Heid~gg~r attempts this by asking "why are 
t},lere assents, why 1is thei'e anything at all, rathe:r, than no·thing?119 
He say;s continuously that such a question compels us to ask the1 pre-
1 
liminary question:. "How does it stand with Beitl:8'?1110 The question 
12 
does not deal with the nature of entities as explained in Aristotle's 
case, but investigates "why" or "rather than nothing" as it is. Hei-
degger's main concern in philosophy is to know Being opening and laying 
the ground for entities. 
One reason for this is t.hat the universality of Being is not that 
of a class or genus. If we talk. about a being or an entity, we can 
mean anything involved in the whatness of the object; when, however, we 
talk of Being simply, it is exemplified in all the beings. The term, 
11Being1 " therefore, does not define the realm of entities which is 
articulated conceptually according to genus and species. 11 Heidegger 
thinks of it as naming "something" which underlies all the inflections 
i 
12 
of the verb, to ~o It is not an abstract, empty notion. Being in 
Heidegger preserves the notion of dete~minate characteristics for 
"somethings" as beings. Being exhibits the intimate connection which 
entities have with Being. Being is the source of and the actual Being 
of the being of'entitieso 
Being and beings are not comparable. 13 The Being of a house, an 
ontological character of that entity, is not like the color of the 
house, an antic property. 14 Heidegger holds that past philosophers 
have nonetheless usually understood Being--if. they have concerned them-
selves with it at all--to be an entity, usually the highest _or supreme 
t 't. 15 en .J. y. Here Heidegger1most clearly departs from the Greek philoso-
phers. For Being in the Greek tradition came to be understoad as sub-
stance, 11 ousia," and substance in turn was equated with "parousia," 
presence. That which is truly present is the enduring, the unchanging, 
to which both past and future are irrelevanto So in Plato; Aristotle, 
and later Christian thinkers, Being became identified with the timeless 
13 
and supreme, and ontology passed into theology. Heidegger avoids this 
traditior:3-al pattern. For him Being ~s neither God nor a world-ground 
as it is in the German idealist tradition. 
When we ask what Being is, how it pan be charac.terized and known, 
we find in Martin Heidegger's thought as yet no satisfactory and full 
answer. When he came to describe Being .as such, the traditional lan-
guage of metaphJ'."si,cs failed him. Since the publication of Sein Und'' -
,Zeit, he has tried to describe what may be his answer. to,the question: 
what is Being? In the late essay, On Time c:+nd Being, Heidegger has 
I 
ch~racterized Being indirectly by telling us ~hat are .false ways of 
understanding it·~ · He says v' 
Being is not a thing~ is not~ in timeJ yet Being as pre'~encing6 
remains determined as presence by tiihe, py what is tempora1.I 
By "remain, 11 he means not to disappear, to p;es~n~e. In 'orde'r to ex-
-1. : ' 
plain it more in detail, we must think 16£- it~ Heidegger says, "Being, 
I · ' 17 
by which all beii,gs as such are marked, l)1eans presencing." We shall 
- I . 
think Being in order to think it' itself into its own eiement. 
But we may askg ho~ is Being discovered and illuminated? There 
is HE;lidegger 0 s different me'thodology' e~en if it never has been indi-
cated as a methodology.. This is t:\1-e reason why Heidegger has been said 
I 
to reject the traditional'language of metaphysics. There are some 
clues in Heidegger similar to the method of Lao..:Tzu (one of the Chinese 
I 
philosophers) o There is' some attempt to describe how Being is revealed: 
In order to emphasize the reference of ~eing to the essence 
of man as well as man's essential relation to the openness · 
of Being as suchooo understanding of Be;i.ng is itself a defi-
nite characteristic of Dasein 1 s Being. 1~ 
For "Dasein is in such a 'way as to be something whi6h tinderstands some-
thing like Being. u 19 So the understanding of Being wiU be accomplished 
14 
in communication between Dasein and Being. Heidegger explains the com-
munication in the following ~ay: 
Philosophy is the correspondence to the Being of being.000 20 
The phrase, "the correspondence," means "which discusses the appeal of 
the Being of being. 1121 
It is not difficult to find a concept similar to Heidegger's in 
the work of one of the ancient Chinese philsophers, Lao-Tzu. Lao-Tzu 
uses the term Taoo Even though Tao plays a great role in Lao-Tzu's 
philosophy, we must confess a difficulty in describing it. Some dif-
ficulty exists in the meaning of the term "Tao" itselfo Chinese 
thinkers call the highest reality Taoo Tao is the origin, destiny, 
creative principle, as well as final cause of all things in the world. 
In its ultimate aspect Tao is conceived to be "Nothingness." In rela-
tion to heaven it means the way that heaven can exist. In relation to 
man it means the way that he ought to existo Tao originally was used 
in the sense of the way someone ought to act. But Lao-Tzu also tries 
to apply the concept of Tao to the creation as well as to the suppor,t-
ive foundation of the universe. So this meaning of Tao, at least, is 
essentially different from that of Confucius. Confucius explains the 
relation among human beings in five principleso The central idea in 
Confucius is~~ or humanityv which develops the whole Confucian move-
mento Confucius explains the word, 11 humanity,iv as something which 
masters oneself and returns to propriety. 22 This involves the realiza-
tion of the self and the creation of a social order. Confucius says, 
One who can practice five things wherever he may be, is a 
man of humanity •••• ; earnestness, liberality, truthfulness, 
diligence, and generosity.23 
But Lao-Tzu asserts that the Tao provides principles for man from 
itself. 
Tl;le Tao pr~duced the One; the One produced the Two~ the Two 
produced the Three; the Three pr.oduc~d all things. 4 
15 
La:o-tiizu seeks satisfaqtitm f~'f' man's ,needs by formulating, a metaphysi-
' .. 
cal cosmology. ln his theory of ethics, the ,attributes of Tao inform 
the individual how or what- to do in a society as well as in a family • 
. l 
'A man's wa3 of life should.be based on an understlmding of Tao~ 
· The varibus meanings of Tao hai>"e been expl~~ed in the ~ Te· Ching, 
0 o owhich,i being one of the earlies~ philosophical texts, con-
tains sorpe af the purest and most ori.ginal metaphysical specu-
lation done .by the Chineseo25 
According to Chen'' s opinion 
Nothingness literally means 'there-is-not,' 'nothing' 'the 
.. negative O o In the Tao ';L1e Ching, Tao is primarily described 
· as the u not O and u no' : Tao has no name, no knowledge, no 
action, no desire,, etc. Tao is wu, the 'not.' Wu is not 
merely the negation of all limitations and determinations, 
it contains in i tsel:f no affirmatio'n ~t all. • •• Because Tao 
is ultimately !E;, ev~n Tf:1.o's existenge is said in Chapters 
4 and 6 to be a matter of ques\tion.2 
' 
11iterally speaking, :i;n the notion of Tao, Nothi~s can b~ very puz-
zling, especially to Westerners,trained in the tradition of the philo-
sophy of being. 27 For in the!!£,!! Ching, Nothingness and Being form 
a polari,ty within the notion of Tao-' nothingness' being the opposite 
of uBeing' and productive of 'Being.• This is clear in many ehapters 
I 
in the~ 'Te· Chipg (I,. 10, · 11, 14,' 34, 40). Because of this polarity, 
many different in~erpretations of ~~o ~ave been given to us. For in-
stance, there are two examples, Wang Pi (246-249) and Kuo H~iang (d. 
312). 
For Wang Pi,· the concept of nothingness is restricted to what is 
formless and nameless. He sa3s, 
All being }).as qegun with non-being. Therefore when there is 
yet'no form nor name, .. it is the.beginning of ten thousands 
things •••• The ten thousand things.depend on it to begin, 
de:?end on it t~ complete, ibut no one knQws how. This is, 
called to go to the origin of origins.2~ 
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For Wang Pi, nothingness is the origin of all things because it is- the 
original state qf all things. JFor kuo Hsi~ng, nothingness as a princi-
ple to account for the generation of all things becomes quite unintel-
ligible. He SBJ'S, 
.Since notliingnes~ is nothingness, it cannot give .ibirth to 
being. B.efore 0being 1 is born, there is nothing to produce 
'being. u Therefore who gives:·birth to what fs born? .Afl. 
things come to be by' themseives~ 
Acoording to Kuo Hsiang, there can.be no movement from non~being to 
beines,, from potentia:li ty to actuality; all movements are .self-mofements 
from one state of actuality to another state of actuality. It is not 
necessary for us to m~e distinction between Wang Pi and Kuo Hsiang be-
cause originally Lao-Tzu had both meanings of Tao in his notion bf 
Nothi~esso 
-l 
But sometimes, we use our own investigation. No matter what oom-
mentary subje·cts have been shown to U:s, we . -ed to unqerstand the sub-
ject by our own endeavoµr.· 
As Heidegger says that "philosophy is the correspondence to the 
Being of being,n Lao-Tzu suggests the direct appr~ach to Tao. When 
man acts concretely in accordance with·the principle of Tao, he actua-
lizes the attributes of Tao. Just as Heidegger's attitude of listen-
ing to the voice from Being (Sein) is necessary for us, so also .an act 
to involve,oneself in Tao is necessary for us. Everything in man can 
be satisfied b? contacting or responding to Tao. For example, the main 
interest of Taoism and Confucianism is life; the chief difference is 
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that in Taoism the preservation of life co~es with responding to nature, 
whereas in Confucianism the fulfillment of life comes with.the artifi-
cial effort of man. 
It seems to me that man in Heidegger and Lao-Tzu is not a self-
, . 
sufficient being in the se.nse that he cannot be essentially thought of 
without considering his relation to Being (or Tao). Man is this rela.-
tion itselfo Relation io Being might be the yery heart of human es-
sence. In other words, whatever man does is only his response to Being 
(or Tao). Because of this situation, Sartre's proposition that exis-
tence precedes essence, is as remote as can be from these philosophers. 
Heidegger especiaHy puts his philosophical point: in the le--tter on Hu-
1 
manism: "Man is not the master of beings. Man is the shepherd of 
Like the shepherd, man's't~e role consists in hii:J function 
I I· :1 
' of taking care of, of being a guardi;;l,n. 
'I , •. 
Man does' 'not create Being but 
he is responsible for it. 
Is there any reason we ought to be attuned to Tao? Accoz:ding to 
Lao-Tzuv the intellectual skill of human beings is unnaturiil as a way 
to satisfy their needs; unnatural in the sense that human reason/is 
not. durable. In 'contrast' t'o the unnatu.ra~ skill of h1.'l.man beings, he 
' ' ' 
proposes to us th~ unchangeable as durability. 
Heaven and eal'th are ·enduring. ' 
The reasoh why heaven·and earth can.be enduring is· that they 
do not.give themselves life. Hence they are able tb be long-
lived.30 
i 
Heaven and,earth do not try to be long-lived by themse~ves; n~verthe-
less9 they are full of Ufe enough to bear all creatures. Nobody has 
ever heard that heaven and earth try to preserve tneir life. They en-
dure· forever. Some, of: us may raise the question how'eternal· durability 
is possible for man. Lao-Tiu anewers in th& following way·a 
, 
Returning 1to One's del:l:t.iny ~'3 ,kn8wn as the constant, Know-: 
ledge 'of the constant is known as discernment,;,, The way to 
perpetuit:r j1 And to the end of one's days one will meet him . 
no-danger. 
He who 1does ndt lose hi's 'station will endure. He who lives 
oU:t his days has had a'long life.32 
'l'o know harmony is called the constant. ''To know the c'onstant 
is c'alled discernrnento33 
This is called the .. WaJ': of. deep 'roots arid firm st.ems by which 
one lives to see ma:rzy d~s.34 . 
I 
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The nature of enduring Tao is called nothingness in relatic;m to the ; 
I 
cosmology; and in relation to''human na:ture, :Lt is call:ed ~, meaning 
virtue, It is known that Tao' was considered 'the central concept in the 
thought of Lao-Tzu. The Tao·or way of Tadi'sm is metaphysfoally an ulti-
mate goal qr state. It is )referred to by the iuse of a singular term, 
and must be given its place among the 111oni1sms~ For La.o-Tzu as for 
Heidegger there is one ground for all things, but the Tao is mor~, 
As explained 1 above,· corioertiing 'tilie c,r,iestion of l;l.ow Being ( or Tao) 
is discovered, it can be discovered through the,investigation of, the 
listening to 9' or me<;li tating upon language. 'Language in Heidegger can 
be oonceiv~d: in a wa::f directly related to most modern thinking~ It is 
!: 
not a mere tool or instrument, nor does its e/3sence consist entirely 
in i~s·being a means ~f transmitting information. Language is the su-
preme event of human exis·tenoe. 35 For Lao-Tzu, Tao is adumbrated by 
reason, but is to be attained by the quiet observances of,a simple life 
which refuses to be perturbed by evils which are superficial~ 
How does it stand with Being? as well as Tao in Lao-Tzu? 
Our understanding of Being and Tao will be clear in the oonbept o'f ' . . . 
Nothingn~ss. Strictly speaking, Being is different from a being, or 
property. Also _Nothingness in Lao-Tzu and Heidegger is not simply 
empty. They tell the holiness of Nothingne,s full o'f i teel:f. 
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CHAPI'ER III 
APPROACHING CLUE TO UNDERSTAND BEING AND TAO: 
HEIDEGGER AND LAO-TZU 
A definite ~ethod for understanding the meaning of Being and Tao 
has never been given in the philosophies of Heidegger and Lao-Tzu. For 
Being and Tao were not products of rational, intellectual effort in ,,re-
lation to an appropriate'word. 'l'he principle of nothingness in the 
philos~ph;y of ~ao-Tzu is "nameless," which indicates.the existence of 
eternal and infinite Befng, which transcends space and time and is un-
limited in its nature. Re~arded from the standpoint of its lack of 
. 
limitation, it is completely independent, that is, absolute. "Abso-
lute" means that it is r,elative to nothing ·and is self-sufficient. 
"Its lack of limitation" means that nothing can name it, in order to 
·, I 
make a distinction in an epistemological sense. 
In Heid~gger, some methods for answering the question "What is 
Being?", are suggested. He SaJ"S in one place, for instance, 
••• The ground is from ~here beings as such are what they are 
in their becoming, perishing and persisting as something that 
ca~ be kn~wn, handle.~ and work.ed upon~ ~t the ground, Being 
brings beings to thei~ actu~lJpresencing. ' 
Heidegger refer~ to the groun~ of bei~s to answer to the question what 
Being· is. So he BaJ"B again, ·" ••• Yet. _!Being as pres~nc)j.n:g remains de-
. ' 2 ' termined as presence by time, by what is temporalQ" To remain means, 
I 
for Heidegger, not to disappear, to presence. The horizon fbr Being 
0 
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is the opening in time in order to bring beiings to their actual pre-
I 
sencing. Thus 11 titne is determined by a kind of Being .... "How is Being 
supposed to be determined by time? Being speaks out of the constancy 
of time's passing awa:y."3 
In other words, Being has a' te:mporal character. Temporali ty is of 
its very essence. Being cannot be thought of as separate from time; 
time is Being coming to opennesso So Heidegger has demonstrated in his 
book Being §:!£ Time that time is the "horizon of Being. ,.4 
But he also asserts in another essay: 
'Being' and Time 9· is the attempt to interpret Being in terms 
of the transcendental horizon of time. What does transcen-
dental mean,here? It does not mean the objectivity of an 
object of experience as constituted in consciousness, but 
rather the realm of projection for the determination of 
Being, that is, presencing ;~ such. ••• 5 
From this statement, we can infer some clues abc:mt the method for un-
d~rstanding Being~ the transcendental horizon of Dasein for Being. 
Existence means literally to be present outside somewhere. A human 
being is opened outs:i:de in time. What a human being had already comes 
out in time through opening. What is 1twhat a being had already?" That 
is a relation of human existence to ~eing as ground. As explained in 
the Letter £Q Humanism, "man is not the master of beings, man is the 
~ 6 
shepherd of Being." 
The horizon of Being helps us underst~nd the meaning of the term 7 
Being. The Horizon of Being7 as already indicated in the above, is 
human existence (Dasein). The term "horizon" has a different meaning 
from the physical horizon. Heidegger ineans the human being's mental 
horizon, "being conscious of •• 0 11 • Man can see something beyond the 
horizon, which serves as a window to show something over there. For 
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only Dasein (human existence) can ask about the existence of entities 
(Seienden) as well as hims.elf (Dase in), and also can decide his action 
by undel:'_standing Being. That, is wey~' through understanding Dasein, it 
will be possible to know 11 the reference of Being to the essence of man 
as well as man's essential relation to the openness (Da) of Being as 
such ••• '111 
In Lao-Tz:u, a definite method has not been suggeste.d to understand 
Tao. That analogy might serve us as a method for understanding Tao has 
' 
been suggested in Lao-Tzu: female, mother's principle, water, valley, 
etc. The reason is that in spite of the fact that Tao itself is not a 
product of rati.onal intellectual e:ffort, Lao-Tzu's philosopey has been 
expressed in th~ mental process. It is only by thorough dissection of 
the peysical organism that we know about the parts. But Tao is said 
to indicate something other than the totality of the universe. 
Totality means that the whole is only the aggregation of its 
parts without an ultimate principle. • • • Unity mus.t exist be-
fore e,veryth:i:ng else, and everything presupposes urti ty as the 
condition of its individuality and rank within the whole~ 
Thus the Tao or the One is unity, but not totality, and is 
prior to all things.a 
' 
The unity a.nd'priority of this ultimate principle are formulated in 
China by LaO-Tzuo In some sense, the namelessness of Nothingness is 
the nature of the ultimate principle dis.earned. 
: 
That is wey, in ordel:' to understand the true meaning of nothing 
in Lao-Tzu 0 s phi1osopey, we 1must make ever':{ effort to dissociate our 
minds from intellectual ·scientific attitudes. All things.in the uni-
terse share not only in "thingness," but also in Nothingness. The 
logical method is not .the only expression of the most positive truth; 
but in'Lao-Tzu an illogical way is often strongly, used to ?Pen the most 
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positive truth. For instance, as nothi~ess is the wa:y to the very 
1 positive truth of Tao, simplicity, quietude, naturality without action 
ma:y be the av~ilable wa:y to unde;stand.Tao.9 
To elucidate the meaning o.f Being, Heidegger began. opening the 
horizon of Dasein for Being in itself. In other words,' Being in itself 
has an ontical •priority, but Dase in plays the role of a window ·to ··open 
or disclose the meaning of Being. A human being is able to extend his 
mental horizon on the basis of consciousness in order to unveil Being. 
In Lao-Tzu, Tao served sufficiently to indicate its essentially practi-
cal motives. The practical motives for life must be foundin following 
nature. Through following nature, man can find some wa:ys to understand 
Taoo In this section, I want to suggest some clues for understanding 
Being and Tao. 
The Worldhood of Dase in and Discourse:. 
Heidegger 
Dasein means literally "being-there." Dasein can be said to exist. 
What is the distinctive characteristic of existence as human Dasein? 
The basic state of Dasein in Heidegger's view is characterized as 
11Being-in-the-worldo" This is to speak not of manv but of Dasein's 
fundamental constitution. Also he prefers this term to express man's 
peculiar wa:y considered ontologicallyo 
In relation to an unders.tanding of why Heidegger defines Dasein 
as Being-in-the-world, a firs~ observation about the concepts of "ex-
istence, 11 "world," 11 in" will help us understand his point of view. 
At first, Heidegger realized that."existence as Dasein"--usually 
called "human life"--should be separated.ontologically from all the 
27 
things which are not Dase in in its ess,ential respect. The existence 
of Da~ein is determined not by qualities, but possible ways of Being. 
In other words~ man has not the essence of an objecto Man in Heideg-
ger's view is not described in terms of the 11 objectiye properties of 
something merely extant, but his possible ways of being, and only 
10 these." So man·as existing is not complete or fixed in his being. 
! ' 
' ' 
He will be alwaysj more than he is now. His being is never complete at 
any given moment. Because man exi,sts, he can choose for himself. That 
is why, to call man "Being-in-the-world" is to say something quite dif-
ferent from what can be said about an object~ for instance, a match in 
a box. Heidegger's interest in Being-in-the world' is o"ntological or 
existential. 
Heidegger uses the expression, Being-in-the-world, to indicate a 
' fundamental characteristic of human existence, namely man's intercourse 
11 in the world with all the t:tiings belonging to the world. To reach an 
existential understanding of Dasein, we have to develop ihe second con-
sideration on 11 -t;he world·. 11 
The term, world,· in Heidegger indicates thf;l 'state, the how in 
which human Dasein is as a. whole. Especially, Heidegger really refers 
to an individual world of a p~rticular man (human existence), but not 
to the structure of evefYbody's world, which means the same as the 
world of a·ll human beings. , As contrasted with the common world, the 
individual man's world is ·formulated only through his own world. So 
. - I . . 
Heidegger s~s that the, world of Dasein is the pla?e "wherein a faoti-
cal Dase in as such can be said to be •1112 I,n the ontological sense, 
Heidegger called the world of Dasein 11 the worldhood of the world as 
such, 1113 but he ~lso desi~ated the world of Da.sein to be 11 the 
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ontologico-existential conoept of worldhood. 1114 
As already indicated in:the above, the term, "worldhood," does not 
refer to the sum total of the things of nature, nor to a fundamental 
structure of the community of men. But it means originally 11 the how" 
in which the things which are in the world are in the world as related 
to human Dasein. The things are not simply in the world, but they are 
encountered within the world. In other words, .the entities in.the par-
ticular human Dasein's world in Heidegger's view are not meant to be 
construed in terms of the physical function of In. Those entities 
which man as' human Dasein encounters in his own world are characterized 
in that world by the way the ;ter~ "In'~ funcd;lons. Thus, to be 1n his 
. -· . 
own world does not mean for· man merely .-~o. be located in it; as a rock 
is, but to be concerned witn it in h~s ex1stence. A match is 1!: a box, 
but when a man is ih his hGl&, this·· relation, 1· obviously, is not pri-
marily the same as the relation of the \match to the box. The former 
is "spat~al t II but the relation Of a man With· his home means '°tO 11 dWell 
inf" "stay iri" ~hich ts more than spatial. We can see why Heidegger 
. ' . I . 
defines human Dasein as Being-,.in .... the-world 1• through his ip.terpretation 
of the term,: 1!! (living-in, i,n-d.welli~)o ·B~i:hg-:iJn here means an ex-
I 
i,stential relation, and is to be· distingq.ished from the physical rela..; 
tion of" being within the worldo 
The special considerable p6int 1 of the existential use of In on 
r 
the worldhood of Dasein is based on the following: for an entity to 
be in a person's world is for it to be an object of his concern. 15 So 
Heidegger thinks of "just thinking about something" rather than "just 
looking at something," as the better way of being concerned about the 
16 something. Thus the existential use of the term, "In," has the basic 
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meaning of "dwelling with those things with which the person is famil-
. " 17 
iar and looking after them caringly. 11 For man to experience an ob-
ject as it is, is to experience and interpret that object in terms of 
that person's world. Huma:h Dasein's world serves as a necessary con-
dition for the posei bili ty ~f t:iie particular person's experience, bu.t 
the common world is a necessary condition fo:r the possibility of every-
one', s experience. The exi,stentfal understanding of the world orig:i.-
. "I 
nates in the consideration of the t~ings within the world which con-
front man in human Dij.sein 1 s concern as Being-in-the-world. In short, 
Heidegger explains Being-in-the-world as the way in which Dasein's 
character is defined· existentially. The human Dasein 1 s world must be 
the world which designates the ontologico-existential concept. 18 Also 
the character of the w9rld oh the ontologic'al structure of Dasein as 
In-Being is called the worldhood of the·world. I have explained the 
fundamental character. of Dasein as Being-in-the-world. To call man 
"Being-in-the...;world" expresses the character of man that as existing 
he is bound up with the wqrld. 
Espec'ially, in constructing the existential concept of the world, 
Heidegger returns to the practical character of the entities within 
the world as they confront 'man in his c9ncerno He tries to analyze the 
constitutive attributes not of the things as present to hand (Vorha.n~ 
den), but as utensils (Zuhanden) as man encounters them in his own con-
cerno So things ~s r$lated to human Dasein are originally encountered 
and discovered only in connection with his practical concern, not in an 
exclusively theoretical attitude. On the foundation of man's practical 
concern, Heidegger has defined the worldhood of the world as 11 the Being 
of the ontic condition of the possibility of the discoverability of any 
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beings encountered in the world. 1119 In other words, the concept of 
worldhood can be the 'foundation1not onl'y to clarify what is meant by 
'' 
the there (Da) of Dasein, but also to understand the direction of 
D . I 20 asein s concern. He says "those entities we encounter in concern 
equipment, 1121 which refers to their "equipmentality, 1122 as related.to 
the direction of Dasein's ~oncern. E~ipme~tality is ~ssentially some-
.thing of thl3 in-order-to, ,,which is discove,red in relatiqn to a practi-
' I 
cal pursuit. So' Heidegger says that "a totality of equipment is con-
• I \ 
stituted by varibus ways,o;f the in-order-to such as serviceability, 
conduci venesl3, ~sabili ty, manipulability. 1123 
On the basis.of the analysis of the "Utensil" and of world.hood, 
human Dasein is said to d:i,sclose one's O'wn spatiality, which'means the 
characteristic of Dasein in terms of the existential function of-In 
' -
with the'world. The central point of the analysis of Dasein as Being-
- ' 
in-the-world is i;o show its Ers~~eity the disclosed, discovered, 
the unveiled state of Dasein. This phenomenon of the Erschlossenheit 
of Dasein should be borne in mind when various modes of Being-in-the-
world are considered. 
Now one of the existentia1s24 of Being-in-the-wttrl·d, as human 
I 
Dase in, coorig:i.nal with Befindliohkei t ( the state of mind) and Verstehen 
(understanding) is~, translated in English as Discourse or speech. 
Discourse is the signifying articulat:i:on of the Being..:in-the-world for 
. I . 
the way in which human Dasein is u,nderstood. Human Dasein in the 
There (Da) in which it is placed, ~xpresses itself as discourse. 
Therefore, the function of language within Heidegger's phenomenological 
method is the key to an understanding of how Heidegger thinks phenomena 
are to be uncovered. So he says in Being and Time, 
We must avoid uninhibited word-mysticism. Nevertheless, the 
ultimate.business of philosophy is to preserve the force of 
the most, el,emental words in which Dase in expresses itself, and 
to keep the common understanding from leveling them off to 
that unintelligibility which functions in turn as a source of 
pseudo-problems.25 
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As already explained above, the actions of disclosing the characteris-
tics of Dasein can be reflecte& in the structure and characteristics 
of languagej because langu~ge reflects the ways in which human being 
is characterized. Discourse in Heidegger's view is not empirical be-
havior, but an existentialistic trait rooted in the constitution of 
Dasein. The whole structure of Discourse in Heidegger's :Philosophy 
has been elaborated on the basis of the analysis.of Dasein. In other 
words 1 . discourse is regarded or analyzed as a fundamental mode of the 
Being-in-the-world of human Dasein, equally essential as the Befind-
lichkeit with its "Primordial self-finding" to where and how, as the 
understanding of Beingus possibilities. Especially, discourse refers 
not only to voice and sounds, but also to the key in which the world-
hood of Dase in itself i,s discovered.a Discourse for Heidegger, there-
fore, is not only language (written or spoken) but also, in some pecu-
liar w~ 1 something which makes languag~ possible. 26 For instance, 
I 
listening (hoeren) and silence (schweigen) belong as potentialities to-
gether with language. So Heidegger says that man is the being who can 
make himself present in his possession of language itself. But Hei-
degger rejects a formulizing of language because its formulation over-
' 
looks the basic meaning ~f discourse, and cuts m~n off from an under-
standing of those basic acts which make language itself-possible. In 
-1 
other words, according to Heidegger, human Dasein can reveal certain 
structures, phenomena which are prior to written language, especially 
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that which is constituted by language. Nevertheless, because the fun-
damental force of discourse is 11 to bring something into the presence," 
' 
an examinati,on of di~cofrse in Heidegger's opinion makes it possible 
to grasp the structural determination of human Dasein's situation. So 
he thinks that its structures are so analogous to the structure of this 
intelligibility--articulation that an examination of the one will. yield 
I , . 
insight into the other. 27 
O~ the other hand, Heidegger agrees with the view that the· limits 
of l~li\89· a:re the limits of a person's worldhood, so language contri-
butes to the formulation and participates ~n the constitution of £act • 
. Constitutive components of language in Heidegger's view are the f'ol..;. 
., ... 
i1owing: ·what is spok~n of, what is said as . such, oomrnun1cation, and 
the information given. In.ot1er wo~ds, nobody can get outside of human 
Dasein' s language to compare its structure with!. the· structure of things. 
,. 
In the structure and function of language,, anything about Being ought 
to be reflecte'd• That is 'to say, to speak of Being is 11 to think of the 
. I ' 
essence of l~a.ge in its correspondence to Being' arid, what is more, 
as this very correspondence, i.e., 'the dwelling of man's essence."28 
So he says that' language is the 11 House of ~eing. ,; 29 Discourse in 
Heidegger's view i~ not only the, voice of Being, but alsd the house 
wherein man exists. Language is the plearing-and-concealing adv~nt of 
Being itselr. 30 But,language is also the gr~und. which lets human 
Dase in reveal itself or be determined as what it is,. 
I 
Unfortunately,' according to Heidegger, human Dasein has appeared 
as modes of Sprachverfall, which means losing the house of language. 
As already considered in the above, since language for Heidegger is 
the."House of Being," the truth. of Being can be reflected in the 
33 
structure and function of language. Languageless means that human 
Dasein is homeless (unheimlioh). The human Dasein, who loses the truth 
of Being(~ Wahrheit des Seine), expresses itself through idle talk, 
curiosity and ambiguity. In t~e languageless, the concept of sem-
blance31 can be referred to in formulating the structure of Dasein~ 
A semblance is something that looks as if it were other in character 
than it actually iso Heidegger defines a sel)1blance as "something which 
h. 't lf ht . "t lb 't · t 32 sows 1. se as w a 1.n 1. se :c .1. 1.s no•" In other words, it looks 
as if it'were, looks to be, but in fact is actually not. A semblance 
is something that only seems to have.a certain quality. 
Bec;:i.1.1-se of the above condition', in Hei~egger 1 s view-a ref),.ective 
turn on our own self is required to restore the truth of Being. "Turn-
;ing on11 is rl.ot a simple matter; it must involve the attainment of what 
Heidegger terms authenticity (Eigentlibhkeit).33 At the same time the 
attainment of this autheriticity, according to Heidegger, is what opens 
one toward Being. 34 
The worldhood of human Dasein cannot be an objective thing of 
' 
knowledge 9 but must be an environmental world formulated on the direc-
tionality of human Dasein's concern. Furthermore, an analysis of human 
Dase in I s structures embedded in language ought to yield knowledge o'f 
Being, the meaning of Being. In other words, with a proper under-
standing and analysis of discourse based on the worldhood of Dasein, 
Being in its "equiprimordial" structure can be uncovered or opened. 
Thus language is a cent~al element in understanding the worldhood of 
human Daseino 
Through a detailed analysis of Dasein, Heidegger attempts to re-
veal Being itself. Specifically, the language of man is needed to 
34 
bring the silent words of Being into human discourse. 
The Transcendental Horizon of Dasein 
for Being: Heidegger 
For M. Heidegger, the notion of transcendence has been defined as 
a "going beyond" in his book,~ Essence .2f Truth. This going-beyond 
is not concerned with particular beings or ·their rea~tions in order to 
get to the Supreme Being (in a religious sense), but witht th~f rela-
' tionship of all hwnan beings to Being. Transcendence expresses the· 
distinguishing mark of the human being as Dasein; the way in which it 
points us to Being itself. Heidegger says; · 
••• then it is right to say that transc~nden.be :i;ndd.:cates the 
essence of the subject a.IJ,d; is the ·fundamental structure.of 
subjectivity. The subject never exists·mainly as a 'subject• 
so that it can also tra.m.sc;e~d toward objects especially'if 
they are there at the disposal of the subject, but being-a-
subject means: to be the being in the transcendence and as 
the transcendence.35 · 
.I 
The importance of 11 the transcendence" can be considered as a means 
'; 
(the way) to shed,light on the reality of Being. But the transcend-en-
. ,l I 
tal horizon also ,is important as the foundation or' ground which makes 
1 
it possible to reveal the character of Being. 
According to Heidegger, human existence must be able to understand 
itself not only in that "lam," but in the possibility that "l can be,f' 
and thus come toward himself in the light of Being. In other words, 
man must be able to transcend, to go out beyond himself a:s he already 
is to the possibilities of his being, and it is this unique way of . 
.. I 
being which Heidegger calls existing. What at first comes to light in 
! 
this transcendence is not something outside·artd beyond the world, but 
precisely human beings as the beings they are--human beings' facticity. 
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The transcendence of man's being ia only possible in this confro.ntation 
of factici ty of human being with the "other'' reality. 
As a matter of factp the term, "facticity, 11 stands for a way of 
human Dasein as being-in-the-world. That does not mean a fact of na-
ture (Vorhanden) or. an objective fact, ·but a fact in the sense that 
"it is and has to be. 1136 Even though human Dasein does not know "from 
where" and "when," he finds himse1lf in a situation. where "it is and 
has to beo" It is not deniable for Dasein to exist there. "I am here," 
"I am in the, world," is an undeniab;le fact, even though "how?" "why?" 
or "what for? 11 are unanswerable questions. Such a facticity is simply 
given, not chosen. Man as existing is already in a world. 
The possibilities of .existence are always conditioned by the fac-
tici ty of existence. The existence of Dase in is n:ot pure p_o.ssibili ty, 
but always factical possibility. In other wordsp while there are some 
facts in nature Dase in can choose, Dase in cannot deny what-has been 
given to its individual existence. Dasein has a relation to oneself 
in a wa;r that is peculiar to him as existing. Existence is always 
mine. So "I am and have to be myself in my worldhood. 11 Facticity is 
cha~acterized not only by the individuality of my existence, but also 
by what Heidegger calls 11 thrownness" (Geworfen)o Heidegger says that 
"an entity of the character of Dasein is its 'there,' in the sense that 
whether explicity or not, it finds itself in its thrownness. 1137 
The term 11 thrownness 11 he.re means the There of Dasein, the actual 
situation in which Dasein finds itself. The structure of facticity in 
existence (I am myself and no one else, I am and have to be in the 
world) is part of the disclosure of ontological anxiety towards the 
hidden background (where he comes trom and where he is going remain 
hidden). The thrownness means again that it has been already thrown 
into the potentiality pf death. Wheneyer Dasein exists, it.is also 
already "thrown" into the potentiality of death_. The thrownness unto 
death, in some sense, unveils Dasein more genuinely and more penetrat-
ingly in the Befindlichkeit of anxiety. The anxiety of death is dread 
of one's own ipnermost and inescapable potentiality of Being, not to 
be overcome. What is dreaded in the state of anxiety is the 11Being-
in-the-world.11 
As Dase in is alwa_ys es'sentially thrown as potentialities into the 
There of Dasein, Dasein alwa_ys projects essentially its potentialities. 
So the term "project" is concerned with the f~ll disclosed.ness of 
Being-in-the-world. ~he project is the activity (the counter-acting 
to the thrownness of Dasein) by which Dasein throws itself forward 
into its potentialities. "A project," (something that ~as been thrown 
forward, projected,) does not mean just azzy kind of proj'ect, like going 
for a picnic tomorrow, but means the groundp plan, the first basic de-
sign, the all~embraoing conception which in advance encircles the whole 
and so make's it possible 'for any detail to make sense. Agairi,, as re-
lated to man',s possibilities, the "project" sugge~ts intention or pu;r-
pose in relation to the practical concern. By this, a project is not 
meant as a plan which has been thought out and,then put into operation, 
but the ongoing structural 6rientation of all Daseinvs activities. 
Things' in themselves are meaningless, even('though what is as pre:... 
sent:....at-hand is there. But they are able to have significance through 
the projecting activity of Dasein's understanding. To project one's 
possibilities means to construct the worldhood of Dasein by disclosing 
one's potentialities of Being. Different wa_ys of understandi_ng are 
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related t? the projecting of different possibilities of Dasein. For 
instance~ man can understand. an object (a fork) in :the sense t.hat he 
has discovered its instrumental character in relation to Dasein's 
worldhood. He makes the ob'ject serve as one of his possibilities in 
prbjecting his potentialities upon it. As Heidegger says, 
In the ,projecting of the understanding, entities.are disclosed 
in their possibility.o•• Ent~ties within-the-world generally 
are prbjected upon the world--that is, upon a whole of signi-
ficance, to whose reference-.-rela~ions ~§ncern, as Being-in-
the-world, has been tied up in advance. 
Dasein has always projected itself and continues to project as long as 
Dasein exists. When entities are discovered through the projection of 
Dasein; it can be said that meaning for entities is projected by 
understanding. 
This..gives us some clue to capturing essentially the structure of 
understanding; it throws forward possibilities, but at the same time, 
' 
it holds out toward itself what it has already forethrown. In other 
words, while we throw these possibilities forward, they at the same 
time turn around and seem positively to look at ourselves. But the 
disclosure-of possibilities in human existence is the achievement of 
existential understanding, and also t~e expression of a basic way of 
existing. 
Human existence in Heidegger's view has been marked by a three-
fold character of the existential constitution of Dasein; the state of 
mind, understanding, and discourse. The .understanding in Heidegger's 
view is not theoretical or abstract like·an intellectual activity 
! 
which leads to theoretical knowledge. The understanding in Heidegger 
. ~ ... -!. 
shines (open) light on the "There" of Dase'in in a different way from 
I ~ . -I 
"Befindlichkeit .. 11 The original me~,ning of an understanding discloses 
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entities to the Dasein "for, the sake of which Dasein exists." Accord-
I 
ing to Heidegger, things and persons and the whole. of "Being-in-the-
world" gain their significance from the purpose or aim for the sake of 
which man understands himself to exist. 
·. The disclosedness o:;f understaIJ,ding, as the disclosedness of 
the 'for-the-sake-of-which' and of significance equiprimor-
dially, pertains to the 'entity 'of Being-in-the-world. 39 
This disclosedness lets things lie unconcealed or unhidden in this 
world before human existence. The understanding always touches on the 
whole constitution of Being-in-the-worl~. That is not purely or even 
primarily theoreticaly but is rooted in man's way of being as practi-
cally concerned with this world (Heidegger's example: 11 the hammer is 
heavy11 ).40 So the understanding needs to be formulated not in the ob-
jective world, but in the field of my concern (ex: Zuhanden rather 
than Vorhanden is more important). What is Zuhanden is seen and dis-
covered in its serving function as related to Dasein's concern. The 
understanding is always esi:!entially concerned with potentialities of 
Daseino Understanding unveils man's potentialities of Being to him. 
The "for-the-sake-of-which'' is regarded in utensils or in the world-
hood of-Dasein. 
As already mentioned· above, this d,isclosedness, however, cannot 
happen to some abstract man in general, but only to a factually exist.:.. 
ing man (Dase:$n). Not only that, but also this disclosedness is just 
a basic way of the Dasein's existing. So Heidegger says, 
If Dasein isp it already has, as directing and deserving, its 
own discovered region. Both directionality and de-severance, 
as modes of Being-in-the-wo!1d, 'are guided beforehand, 1 by the 
circumspection of concern.' 
It is this aspect of human being which Heidegger later calls 
39 
"transcendence, 11 including the meaning of anticipatio'n, of go.ing beyond 
the given factici ty. This is what Heidegger's ''existentiali ty11 means. 
The human being is always reaching out beyond itself; its very being 
consists in aiming at wh~t it is not yet. 
Whatever Dasein faces in the world has relation to the whole of 
understanding that it has. Dasein has put entities in his worldhood 
and has related to them. In doing so, Dasein has also assigned it a 
meaning. That isv meanings are not discovered in things 1 but they are 
in relation to things in the worldhood of understanding which Dasein 
has already brought to itself. 
Such projection never outruns the boundaries of the world it has 
been given. It is projection in and of and with the world. So 
Heidegger says 1 
The disclosedness of t_he' 1 there' i.n understanding .is itself 
a way of Dasein's p9tentiality-for-Being. In the way in 
which its Being is projected both upon the 1 fb'.l!'-'the-sake-of-
w~ich0 and upolll si~ifi~ance _(the !~rld), there lies :the 
disclosedness of Being in-general. 
In its own self-projection a?!l.d self-transcendence then, human be~ng at 
once understands its world and becomes its authentic self in the light 
of Being. 
What characterizes the existential known as "understanding," ac-
cording to Heidegger, is that it develops itself as a projection 
(Entwurf) in one direction among many possible determinations. The 
understanding is an existential possible way of being. Its character-
istic structure is the projecti9n. Things are meaningless, but they 
are able to have sig:nificancs through th.e projecting activity o:f 
Dasein°s understanding. The understanding not only is characterized 
by forward direction in its projection but also- is primarily futural 
.40 
II . . . 
( Zukunf t ig) • 
In other words, on the;basis of the primarily future-oriented pro-
jection of understanding, and the primarily past...:oriented state of 
mind, Dasein thus falls into a present moment with things in the world 
' ' , I I 
(Ecstasy of te.mporali ty in Dase in},. which means .th~t the temporali ty of 
Dasein, with its relation to future, past and present, opens up the 
horizon fo:r the qti.estion'apout "Being." It also means there can not 
be any gap ·in continuous time. The present is a moment .connecting the 
past and the future. 
What is specifically connected to the self-transc.endence of th.a 
j ~ 
ecstasy of temporal;i.ty in Dasein, is the existential! ont'ological deatl;i. 
' • •. " I . ·1 
as a mode:of !human Dasein's authenticity. The Being.:..to'ward-death be-
. ' : ! ! J J l • 
I •! 
longs genuinely ahd essentia.:t1y to the Being of Dasein. The arrivaf 
at the boundary of death is at t:tie sam~ time the loes of Dasein by the 
self-projection. It means to ·uncover the unauthentic veils of Dasein 
through the temporality of Daeein. 
Being-towa.rds-dea.j;h is· the anticipation of a pQtentiali ty-fo!'-
Being of t,hat entity ¥hose kind of· Being is anticipation it-
self., In the anticipatory reveiling of this potentiality~ 
for-Being, ,Dasein discl.oses itself to itself as regards its 
uttermost possibility.43 
The "running forward in exis'tential decision" (the cha;racter of 'always 
having to make 1 decisions· among future possibilities} makes Dasein au-
thentic with the future. The formulation of th~ analysis of t1Being-
towarci-death'' · presupposes the authentio po"j;ertiali ty of Dasein:. 
But it is necessary to remember the concept o'f' everydayness, 
which means the mode of Dasein in accordance with-~abit and convention. 
The mode. of everydEzyness is based on 'the1 "They,-time." Heidegger says 
that binding self with other in togetherness is, 
cutting off its primary and primordially genu1ne relation-
ships-of-:Being t9wa.rds the worldhood~ ••• and towards its 
very Being-in.44 . 
So Dasein listens to the publicness of man and maintains itself in ,,, 
idle talk. This is unauthentic Dasein which means the self-loss. 
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Heidegger says, "We take pleasure and enjdy ourselves as I they (men) 1 
· ·45 take pleasure; ••• 
By opening for his own po'tlentli.a.li ty of existe.nce, Dase in lets its 
I 
own self act 'in ~?e way of I inner action. 11 This means to characterize 
the existential structure of the authentic potential,i ty-for-Being, 
:which is essentially connected. wi thl the "running forward in decision" 
to death conceived only in its· 9ntological pbssibility. This attitude 
lets Dase in unve:i:l 'i teelf in'. and 'for, its Beihg as potentiality in ad-
vance of itself~ Especially this II~ fpr~ard in decision" to the 
I , 
potentiality of death makes it truly possible a~ such and makes the 
Dasein free for·it .. By subh running forward in decision, orle's own and 
\innermost extreme poteritiali ty of In-Being can be underst~od in authen-
tic existenceo This means to change the anxiety of death into the ex-
pectation of death, unauthentic D~sein toward death into authentic 
Daseino But Dasein also can ope~ itself for its own potentiality of 
existence by projecting itself into the ground of Being • 
. 
Indirectly speaking, the external anti tiE3s in nature make us in-
vestigate the question of Being. If Being' is what makes possible 
things with determinate characteristics, then an ~alysis of these . . 
entities O structures o;u.ght to yield knowledge of Being. However, what 
lie's behind · the anti ties P in the enveloping· background of all things, 
seems to have little to do with our practical needs considered in re-
lation to the things in our environment. Therefore, Being is not an 
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empty abstraction but something which is the most concrete and closes't 
of presences. The problem is how to bring Being into the light. 
strictly speaking, the meaning of Being is not applicable to entities 
' 
other than human Dasein. Being is understood in the sense of Dasein's 
disclosing of Being, because Dasein has been referred to as being 
I' something which understands something 1 ike Being. 1146 The method used 
by Heidegger is that of phenomenology, which means 11 to let that which 
' 
shows itself be seen from itself in the VefY wa;y in which it show~ it-
..! 
self frotn itself. ,A 7 Phenomenology i's suitable to show the ultimate 
Being itself hidden behind all ~ntities through Daseiµ. 
To elucidate the meaning of Being, Heiaegger began opening the 
'! 
horizon of Dasein fo:r;- Being in itself. In other -!words, Being in •itself 
. . ; f . 
has an ontical priorit~, but Dasein pl~s tli* role of a window to open 
or disclose the meaning of Being. Hutnan 1 Dase'in especially is able to 
extend its mental horizon on the basis of care in order to unveil Being. 
The existential possi bil'i ties of Dase in are used as the horizon to 
bring the meaning of Being into the light. 
I 
, I 
Up to nowi I have indicated that phenomeno*ogy is suitable to show 
. -
the ultimate Being itself hidden behind al+ entities through Dasein. 
Manvs understanding of Being is not an isolated event, n~r merely a 
! 
part in Dasein,, but occurs through,the whole existential wa:y of Human 
. I ' . 
Daseino The unique character of the human being is not confined merely 
to his thinking or cognitive activities but is determined in all the 
\ 
ways in which he can be. Being is in 1he understanding of Dasein and 
not in things. Man is the only being who has an understanding of Being. 
In order to support the·relation between Being and human Dasein, I 
' tried to touch several aspects related to the notion of transcendence~ 
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Human existence in Heidegger's view is 'called "transcendence." Dasein 
' 
as tran~oe~dence isithe starting~:po~nt of fundam~ntal ontology for .the 
question of Being. 
The Harmony with the Inner Pr'i;ncipl·e of 
Nature: Lao-Tzu-
While the goal of Conf~ciartism is 'the f~lly deveiop~ life, that 
.. 
of. 1a·o-Tzu in ~' !,! Ching. is si~plici ty and ;t~e _harmonious life~ A 
simple life means a :l;.if~·of plainness in which profit· is ·disparde~, 
clevern(jlss aban4oneq., selfishness minimized, and d~s'iMs reduc~;d. 48 
It is the life of ''[perfection which seems to be incomplete," of "full-
I I 
-
ness which seems to be empty," of "absolute straightness which seems 
. to be crooked," of "sk1ll which seems to be, clumsy," and "eloquence 
which seems to stut.ter." It is tlie li:fi'e of "producing an~ rearing · 
things withol,tt ·taking possession of them," of 11dbing'work but not 
taking pride init, 11 and of "ruling over things but not dominating 
· them.,A9 
. 
How~ver, it is not di{ficult to think that the mode of a simple 
life· is originated in relation with Tao. The harmonious life means to 
follow the prin9iple ,given to us from Tao. Tne harmony with Tao is 
' . 
formulated through methods_ in accordance with attributes of Tao.· Hu-
man artificiality is m;,t necessary to 1do that. 
! • I 
In order to support our understanding to this point, I w·ould like 
to discuss the following key concepts: i•i:qtui tion and quietude," 
"naturality without action," and "void~" 
"Intuition" is the key word in understanding Taq, unlocking all 
the secrets of Being as well as of non-being (nothing). The method is 
44 
like a private awareness of one's innermost being-e.:dstential self. It 
is a pure self-conscipusness through immediate, direct, primitive pene-
tration instead of by a method that is derivative, inferential or ra-
tional. The distinction between the knower and the known can be re-, 
moved by ide~tifying subject .with object. The 'under~ta:tiding of Tao .by 
intuition is an inner experience ith which the distinction between sub-
ject and object vanishes. This means an immediate contact of awareness 
rather than an inferential or intellectual·proaess. That is why Tao 
does not blos.som into vital consciousness until all distinctions be-
tween self and nonself have disappeared. The nature of the ident~ty 
•· 
between subject .and object can be understood through intuition, apart 
. . 
i • 
from the relation of premise with conclusion or apart from rational 
I • I 
explanation. The awareness of the identification of subject and 6bject 
is the intuited result. of an ontological experience • 
• The approach to Nothingness through quietude is named the 11 losing-
50 methodo II To be quiet means to reflect ori one I s own error by t.hinking 
.. 
about himself carefully. While sitting down,quietly one will know.how 
heedless his temper has beeno In fact, t~roughi quietude one strives 
-
to return to th~ deep root of his Being 1 and to become aware of the deep 
root of all things.51 Bec~use of this view, the state of quietude d6es 
not ask us to find out the physical ?enefits of life. Lao-Tzu says: 
In the pursuit, of learning one knows more eyery d.aY;t in. the 
pursuit of th~ way one does less every day.· Ori~ does less 
and less ,until one1. does nothing at all, .and when one does 
nothing at :all there i.s nothing that. is undone~52 
• j 
'The process of seeing 'and delving into ;the maternal depth of nature 
• j _j -I 
consists of and results in the losing of external interest. 
A0bo:tdihg to the Taoist, when a state of perfect quietude is 
45 
I • I, ~ 
achieved, all the signs of action in the outside world and ore's own 
world will cease. And ~very trace and mark of limitation~ and condi-
tions will also vanish. No artificial thoUght (~.ati~~al thought) will 
disturb. One is aware of a he'avenly radiance within. It is· light in 
darkness. 
Intuition through qu1etude is the Wfl¥ toihaye thbrough knowledge 
about Tao. For instance, according to Lao-Tzu, our :life must oe natu.,. 
I 
ral. To be natural means to live like water, which is "similar to the 
I 
highest good," and "almost identical with Tao. 11 53 Water ''occupies 
places which people detest," but 11 i"t benefits the rey-riad creatures 
without making any demando"54 "There is nothing softer and·weaker t"han 
water, and yet there is nothing better for attacking hard and ·stro:mg 
things~1155 Thi~ is not t~ state of ignorance and incapability.56 It 
is rather a state o·f quietude' harmony and insight.' 
' 
"Naturality- without action'' is one of the important cbncepts in 
Lao .... Tzu 1 s .philo,ophy. We have to clar,ify the meaning of the Chinese 
words, "Wu-Wei," ''Tzu-Jan," which can be li t.erally translated as 11wi th-
out acting (no action,) 11na.turality.n57 
The term 11naturali1ty11 mean's not to work w'i t}l any artificiali tye 
' ' 
It means' nature as if is, but this could not be a negative term in a 
devitalized sense. In o·rder to support our understanding of it! here 
are some examples: 
In a gross Wf3¥i :we take the.example of a whirlpool as a; case 
of pure spontaneity, which signifies nothing. The force of 
the stream tumbling over a fall is l'natcl;led by ihe force' of 
th~ iriertia bf 1ihe body of water wh_ich has already collected. 
These two· forces interact with .su,ch prop9rtion and .symmetry' 
that a circular motion j_ls formed. The flow of the water in 
this form is the completion which'very nearly supp],ies the 
conditions complete spon-taneity.58 
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Again, we may find the same principle in our own breatl+ing. We are 
aware, if we stop tp notice, that there are inhalation.and exhalation 
in alternation. As long is each inhalation moves indirectly into the 
following exhalatton over a smooth course, as it were, this is a con-
dition of complete regularity (spontaneity). 
The term "Wu-Weill also, generally interpreted as not-acting, no 
action, is a.peculiar wa;y, or more exactly, the natural way, of behav-
iour. "The sage. keeps t'o the deed t)lat consists in taking no action 
and practices the teaching that uses no words. 11 59' The natural way ~s · 
·to "support all things in their natural state"' and thus allow them to 
· · 60 
"transform sp9ntaneously. 11 In this manner, "The way (Tao) unde~ 
takes no activity, and yet there is nothing left undone·. 1161 From this 
point, it is quite clear that the way of Wu-Wei is!the ~ay of spon-
taneity, as contrasted with the artificial way, the way of cleverness 
and social oonventi~morality. 
The term, "Wu-Wei" implies a type of human activi ty,1 which ,does 
not mean "the activity of the principles of his time--aggression, force 
. ' I. 
and violence. 1162 As in. the given examples, there is no artificiality 
I l ,,, 
in the flow of water. The movement,· of nature is quiet; unpretentious, 
and yet sure. Lao-Tzti. recogniz~d that greed for power leads to aggres-
siveness and to violence. This is the cause of chaos. He saw that 
11 they overcome the main discontent, but only in such a way as to cause 
further discontents. 1163, 
'What naturali ty wi.thout action means is not an ideal of absolute 
inaction, but a set of positive actions achievable by an invisi~le 
action. That is, 11 the way (Tao) never acts yet nothing is left .,., 
undone. 1164 Even if it looks like no-action, everything can be achieved 
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through the e~dless action. This is the identific~tion of the oppo-
sites: action - inactiml~' 
A man of the highest virtue does not keepiio virtue and that 
is why he has virtue. '. A man of the lowe~t. "V1.rtue never ' 
strays from virtue and that' is why he is without virtue. The 
former never acts yet. ~eaves noth!ng un¢cme. The latter actlil 
but there are things left undone. , 5 
The above verse indicates the paradoxical interrelation of Tao with 
Wu-Wei, or inaction. 'In eontrast, to say bf the Tao that it acts is 
' 
· to limit its effectiveness, because merely by doing some things, it 
' 
must leave other things undone. To say that it does not act at least 
leaves it untrammelled. 
In ensconcing himself in inaction, the Taoist merely imitates Tao, 
which efficacy is universa..l for the very ·reason that it is ~nactive. 
Because Tao is universal spontaneity, everything in nature com~s ibout 
' ' 
' . 
of itself wii. thcn:it any particular kind . of intervent~on ( as opposed: to 
\ 
the act of a, divinity or of ~tovide·nce). 
. . I . I 
~ ' 1-
Similarly, . on· the human le'vel, 
' a prominent politician em1alates ,p.aturally the attributes of Tao wh~n he 
l 
I 
does not· strive for f~e and does not express his contribution to the 
people. 
But the attitude of no-action is not pure passivity. Action and 
non-action are not,isolated, but e-oa.lescent. Things in action are 
simultaneously forever in non-a:ctia,ll; things in non-action are f orev~r . 
in actionG The -wise follow tpe path of non-assertion and teach without 
words. Various symbols are used to illustrate this idea,· for example, 
water and the valley. 
In the world there is nothing more submissive and weak than 
water. Yet for attackigg that which is hard and strong 
nothing can surpass it. 
The reason why the River and the Se.i are able to b~ king of 
the hundred valley~ is that they exoel in taking the lower 
position~ Hence they are able to be· king of the.hundred 
valleys. 1 '· 
These verses symbolize the way Tao functions. In order to formtilate 
Tao, we must find out how Tao functions. The low lying places are 
themselves the image of Tao because the water·converges in them. The 
weak overcomes the strong and in so doing it becomes strong itself and 
so falls victim in turn to the weak. The virtue of humility can in-
fluence positively the egois~ic person. The unknown influence lets the 
' ' 
strong change himself. Eut Tao can be no more like non~being than it 
' I 
is like something. Nevertheless, Lao-Tzu is sometimes called a nihi-
list. (This will_ be explained in more detail in a later section.) So 
we must direct our attention to the significance of the paradoxical 
harmony. 
Tao is the harmonizing principle. Created things are external, 
composed of contraries. These contraries are harmonized by Tao. Fot 
instance, man mu~~ act in such a w/zy as to avoid the two extremes, evil 
and good._ His· actipn should tran~oend ,the opposites ia 'the harmoni'ous 
' I I 1 • 
state of the two. In the sense of activity, 68 this no-action cannot 
I ' • 
always remain pure p~ssivity; otherwise it _will defeat its own purpose. 
Eut this no-action is so;ft and yie~ding like wate·r. Yet it overcomes 
all. No-action cannot stop the gentle yielding movement of water. The 
activity of water is defipitely ,not pure.passiv;ity. It is actively 
' ' ' ' 
passive in the sense of an o~er '~conquering-yielding" activity. It tt 
very active in its passivity. To have harmony man's activity must 
have the qualities of quietness! of nature' and of the "gentle-ever- · 
conquering-yieldingness" of water. Thus he conquers all without effort. 
49 
Thus, the life of artificiality drew Lao-Tzu's vigorQBS attack 
'. I ~' ' J • 
and led him to glorify the reality of non-being, ·the ,utility ··Of, t:tJ;el 
I • ,L ' I 
useless, and the stre.h. of the weia}:co 69· 
In ~ao'."'"Tzu the void is_ ~ferred_rtO',J)'9eiic_E1llY:.and syJnRo;\;i.e1;lly in 
Chapter 5, ~i'"'!!,-Ching. 
I I 
Is rlcit the space between heaven and earth like a ,bellows? 
It 'ie ~inpty without, being exhausted. ,'11he more it· works 
the more ii comes; otii. 1 
It:·oan·:be said that the void which is none other th:a.:i;i the absence;' 
Qf perceptible-qualities, characterizes Tacp. There is rationalized , 
I I 
effortdnvolved in disobeying the attribute of 1 Ta0~ When,we give ra-
tional pursuit to it, we have trouble. The more a society is developed 
by the intellectual pd~er, the more trouble is the result. In Chapter· 
4, Tao is compared to an empty container, a container which contains 
nothing, · .. from'. which all thi!J€.s come. 
':j:'ao is like an empty bowl, 
Yet in being used it is not depleted. 
Fathomless like deep, water, 
It se~ms to be ·the ancestor of a.ll things. 
By s~ing, · "Tao is ~i~e an empty bowl,'.' the Ta~ !! Ching means th.at all 
things issue forth from its emptiness. Hence Ellen Marie Chen says 
I J ' , 
that as compared to.deep water, "Tao is the dark, unfathomable depth, 
which is yet the origin as well as the destin,y of all things. 1170 But 
emptiness is something to ~hi?h we have to direct our attention. In 
other wo~ds, the notion of Nothi~ess as the empty in the !!2 !!, Ching 
does not correspond to our understanding of empty space todaJ7. 
I ' 71 
.According to Chen's explanation,' in Chapter 4 of the Tao !! 
Ching the bowl is empty, but it contains air; in Chapter 5 the bellows 
is empty, likewise it contains air; in.Chapter 6 the valley is hollow, 
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again it is not a vacu,um. From these descriptions, it is not difficult 
to think of the image of nothingness as not the absolute empty. But 
the notion of nothingness "as the emptiness of air readily lends also 
theoretical ground to the cultivation of breathing exercises as a prac~ 
tical method to reach union.with Tao." 7,2 
Saying, "Tao is ,like an empty bowl," means a.n empty mind is re-
quired. 73 Lao-Tzu does not all?w artificial effort or practical employ-
ment of reason to increase satisfaction. Lao-Tzu says, "always rid 
yourself of desires in order to observe Tao's secrets. 1174 
The void is efficacious because, like the bellows, it is capable 
of producing breaths at will.· The idea expressed herein is like the 
one associated with the symbol of the valley. The valley is so void 
that all the streams are coming into it. The image of the thirty 
spokes converging toward the empty space of the hub is often used to 
symbolize the virtue of the ruler who attracts all creatures to his 
service. The virtue of being empty brings order to the multiplicity of 
I 
things. The concept of void means "empty, 11 purified of all passions 
and desire. The shape of Tao is allegorized as "empty," being effica-
' 
ciousv and animating all creatureso 
The -t;erms, 11 j.ntuition and quietude," 11 void," "naturality without 
actingp 11 suggest a method for understanding the character of Tao 
through uniting oneself with Tao, and for expressing that character. 
Returning to Tao transfers its character into life. 
The Correlation in the Identity of the 
Opposition: Lao-Tzu 
In many passages Lao-Tzu expounds the action of Tao; in very few 
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passages does he explain the nature of Tao itself. 
In Lao-Tzu Tao is the primordial source of every b~ginning and 
.every end. It can be t}).e realm from which all birth issues forth and 
to which all death :returns in a Il!etaphysical sense. .As the Confucianist 
Rs.tin Ching said, Tao is ~.ni~ood as a mystical concept for the primal 
,. ' . 
stuff of the uni verse or the totality of all thi,ngs. So he says that 
no one in ancient China ta~~· the Tao , correctly. But al though Tao 
is indistinct and ineffable, something hidden in it should be the 
ground to stand for the .totality of all creatures, equivalent to what 
some Western philosophers have called "the absolute." Tao is the univ 
in diversities, and particularity in universality. 
This meaning can be easily understood by means of a comparative 
study of the use of the ,term "Tao" in many parallel and cognate pas-
sages describing different aspects and senses of Tao. Chapters 1 and 
2 in~~ Ching wiH be good examples. 
The way (Tao, nothing) that can be spoken of is not. the 
constant way; · ' ,- . 
The n'.ame (reality) that can be named is not the constant 
name. ( Chapter 1) 
'!'he whole world recognizes the beautiful as the beautiful, 
yet this is only the _ugly; the whole world recognizes the 
good as the good, yet this is only' the bad. (Chapter 2) 
These two verses not only contain two passages similar to each other, 
but also are made of the same type of propositions. This means that 
I Way f O O name, 0 0 beautiful, ' 1 good O are described by identifying them 
with their opposites. The invariable Tao is indicated by variable 
names, but Lao Tzu seems not to be interested in direct exposition of 
the individual variables. To us,1 however, "Way (nothing, Tao)" and 
"name (reality,-,-)" or "beautiful and bad" are the concrete expressions 
of the abstrart opposites. It makes no difference ,which of the two 
would be meant in Lao-Tzu's basic thought-form~75 
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Investigation about', the nature of Te (virtue) might help us under-
stand Lao-Tzu further. In Chapter 49, Lao-Tzu says: 
Those who are good1 I treat as good. Tho~e who are not good 
I Jal,so treat as good~ , In sq doing l gain in goodness. Those 
who are of faith I have faith in. -Those who are lacking in 
good faith, I also have faith in. I~ so doing I gain in good 
faith. 
The above parallel passages are made of identical propositions, reveal-
ing -the nature of Te.· Basically, Te' is an attitude of man toward 
another man, whether he possesses some quality or not. That is to say, 
the nature of Te (virtue) in La~-Tzu is to treat man on the same equal 
standing withrgoodness and good faith. Therefore Lao-Tzu says Te is 
like the following: 11 '110 know harmony is called the constant. To know 
the constant is called discernment. 1176 Te (virtue) brings the oppo-
sites into one great harmony. This makes Te refer to the natural, 
primitive qualities of Tao 9 as opposed to those enjoi~ed by social 
sanction and education. It is a basic pri~ciple of Taoism that one 
should be in harmony wi~h, not in rebellion against, the fundamental 
laws of the universe. 
As we saw earlier, the term "Tao" usually means a road, or a way 
of action in Confucius. Tao was used as a philosophical conc~pt to 
establish communication for the right way of action, but Confucius did 
r 
not treat it as a me:taphysical concept. Lao-Tzu, however, is quite 
different in his theory. His the9ry could be called the unification 
of Tao in a metaphysical sense. Tao is a productive origin as well as 
an ope:r;-ating law for all creatures •. In other words,_, 'rao is the funda-
mental energy which produces the myriad creatures as well as controls 
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the phenomenal world. It is full by itself. But i.t is simple, form- / 
less, desireless, without striving, supremely c,ontent. So the realm 
I 
of Tao is absolut~ly free from limitations and distinctions. Tao is 
called the one without contrast. 
. I ' 
In the example that "the wa:y that can be spoken of is not the 
constant wa:y," the following point should be made. The conijtituents 
of the proposition consist of ~ffirmation and negation in the sense of 
logical definition. Lao-Tzu says, 
I 
The nameless (nothing) was tha beginning of heaven and earth; 
the named (reality) was the mother of· the myriad creatures • 
• • • The.ei two are the same but diverge in na~e as _they issue 
forthon 
"Nothing" and "reality" are a;t the samE:1 ontological,levelo The phrase, 
I, 
'.'Heaven and earth" indicates the bounds of j;he uni verse, but . the phrase 
I 
11 the myriad creatures,". indicates the cont,ents,·therein. And the words 
llbeginn~ng" and l'mot,her" both ~ndicate the origin of the universe in the 
I . . 
' ' 
spatio-temporal sense o None of the terms are ,defined independen');ly. 
. I ' 
They are rather correlated with each other. Hence Lao-Tzu says that 
"Nothing and reality are co-existent. 1178 This exp~ession is the key 
to understanding the relat~on in the opposites. Later the complemen-
l . 
tary relation develops into th~t, of substantial identity. The oppo-
sites have a common origin; t~eir only difference is a matter of termi-
nologyo Their difference is correlated with their identity, paradoxi-
cally affirming the iden;tity of the opposites. This correlation of the 
identity with the oppos1i tes is called "mystery" or "Nothingness .• 11 
Tao is simple~ It is the harmonizing ~~inciple. Even when there 
are ~ontraries in created things, these contraries. are harmonized by 
Tao& In Tao the contraries disappear. The empl]asts on making a clear 
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distinction between doing good and,doing evil is the cause of all evil 
and dis9rder. Man must act in a wa::r.to avoid the two extremes, evil 
and good, in order to be in harmony with Tao. This is something 
' myterious. 
Thecorrelat:;i.on in the identity of the opposites was explained in 
the La?-Tzu expressio
1
n: "What is most perfect seems . t(1 ~e incomplete," 
and "What is most full seems to be empty" (Ch. 14). In these utte~ 
I : 
ances, ,Lao-Tzu was: a step cl9ser· to the golden. mean. "Make. the small 
,' 
I 
big and the few many; do good to him who has done you an injury''. (Ch. 
63). On the surface, he seems to be negative (or just not-active) 
r ,• ' 
since the fundamental principle of life and infancy is the ideal state 
of being (Ch. 6, 20). That is why he seems to put his emphasis on 
I ' ' I 
emptiness and quietude. At bottom, however, his ethical posi".tien comes 
I I 
much nearer to the center than to the extreme. He sa::rs·. 
'I 
Since much talk, alw~s. fails in due c~urse ,-,. it is bett'er 
to adhere to the P+-1nc1pte of centrality.7'7 
The main point in Lao-Tzu is the fact that the measure of all things 
is nature. Simplicity (empty mind), not-acting and. other et~ical 
! ,•1 
ideals are all moral :\.iessons drawn from r.1;ature v wh:ieh is the standard 
for Heaven and Earth as well as man (Ch. 25). It is the wa::r or Tao, 
the universal principle of exist.ence. It is' 11 the' source of Heaven and 
I 
earth" and 11 the mother of all things" ( Ch. 1, 4, 25 f. It is eternal, 
one, all-pervasive and absolute (Qh. 1, 14). It is natural (Ch. 25). 
What has been said indicates the importance of the ultimate prin-
ciple of Tao in the harmonio1;1s correlation of the opposites. To sup,-
port this interpretation, the following quotations are offered: 
:•I 
The Tao produced the One; the One produced the Two; Bo 
the Two produced the Three; the Three produced all things. 
Once there was a time when all things were harmonized through 
the One; the heavens receiving the, One became clear; the 
earth receiving t~e One became calm; spirits receiving the 
One became divine; Valleys receiving the One became full; 
all .things receiving the One began to live; princes and 
kings receiving the One were able to adopt their empires. 
All these are the effec·ts of receiving the One.tn 
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These statements show that the Tao or the One is prior to all things, 
and from the Tao all things derive their order • 
. B:o:t here we must be careful, for the Tao of Chinese metaphysics 
is not outside of nature. It is nature itself, as already indicated 
in the above. It is thus important to note that the Tao is "something 
other than the totality of the universe. 1182 According to the interpre-
tation of Gi-Ming Shien, totality, as far as Tao in Lao-Tzu is con-
earned, means that "the whole is only the aggregation of its parts 
without an ultimate principle. Unity, therefore, does not mean tota-
lity. • •• Unity must exist before everything else, ••• 1183 
The absolute itselfp from which all opposites come and to which 
all opposites return in order to become identified, does not appear 
(Ch. 14). This is one meaning of Nothingness, or Tao. The absolute 
underlies all the relative·things that are. Thus the harmonious iden-
tity of the opposites is very close to Lao-Tzu's first meaning of Tao: 
Non-being definitely does not mean actual 1Nothingness.' 
It is simply a convenient name for what is really inde-
scribable. and, therefore, strictly speaking, unnamable: 
the state which is different from, or ontologicaI1y prior 
to, the state of being of our own organized, finite 
universe.84 
There is Lao-Tzu 0 s own expression: 
There is thing, formless yet complete. Before Heaven and 
Earth it existed. Without sound, without substance·, it 




Tao. Forcgd to 
was Great. 5 
may think of it as the ·mother ·of all 
We do .-not know its name, but we .term it 
give an appellation to it, I should say it 
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As a matter of factv the harmonious correlation in the opposites has 
been shown very well in Lao-Tzu 0 s theory as the mother principle: 
"n • of it as the mother of all beneath Heaven" ( Ch. 25). In Chapter 
4, Tao was symbolized.as the fathomless, deep water, while in Chapter 
5, it was given to us as the emptiness of the female. But in Chapter 
6v Tao was compared to the mysterious female or the valley spirit that 
engenders heaven and earth; 
The spirit of the valley never dies. 
This is called the mysterious female. 
The gateway of the mysterious female is called 
the root of heaven and, earth. 
Dimly visiblev it seems as i 86it were there, 
Yet use will never drain it. 
The analogy of Tao as the female an~ the valley spirit can be said to 
justify Tao as an organic productive principle. The female productive 
power encompasses the seat of productivity for all beings. Taoism, 
with its teaching on non-action (ChG 2, 37), on the need to give up all 
efforts (Cho 43 9 48) 9 to simply abide by the mother (Ch. 52), cele-
brates the love of the mother. Hence 9 according to Chen's opinion, 
While the Christian religion reflects a male-centere,d 
society, Taoism looks back to an age when the mother8with 
her love was t.he 'overwhelming experience of mankind. 7 
What significa.nces are involved in Lao-Tzu 1.s analogy of Tao as 
the mother? Chen°s thought reminds us of 
••• original inspiration to the· existence of a matriarchal 
society, and in the golden age peop1~8cared for their 
mothers 9 but not for their father ••• 
So far, I have ex:plai~ed Heidegger's and Lao-Tzu 1 s individual 
methods of attaining a solution to these questions. Heidegger's basic 
57. 
emphasis was on analyzing the existence-structure of Dasein because 
Being can be disolo~ed in the. existential horizon of Dasein., As with 
Lao-Tzu 1 s thinking, Heid~r attempts to identify Dasein with Sein 
!~rough experience in Being, but also he attempts to find the wholeness 
of Dasein and Sein. 
Lao-Tzu emphasizes the individual life based on attributes of Tap 
rather than analysis the existence-structure of a human being. The 
mode of a simple life is ·originated in relation with Tao, ~d the 
"harmonious life" means to follow the prine'iple given to us fro,m Tao. 
The true life of a human being is only possible in experience of intui-
tion and quietude, naturality without action, and void. These experi-
ences are the WaJ"s.which make it possible·f~r ~ human being to experi-
enoe Tao and to find wholeness. 
As mentioned in the above, Heidegger and Lao-Tzu seem to be dif-
ferent.from each other in the sense that they use different methodo-
logies to unders'tand t11ieir central subject-matters z Being and Tao, 
I 
I 
but both of them have the common final goal: through the experience 
of Nothingness, a human being can understand Being and Tao. 
What characteristics are ~1ained in the notion of Nothingtaees? 
I am going, to explain those characte~istics in the next chapter because 
I dealt al:r(i)ady with the approaching clue to find the attributes of 
! 
Being and Tao. 
I c 
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CHAPTER IV 
META-METAPHYSICS AND NOTHINGNESS 
Meta-metaphysics and the Change of 
Traditional Logic 
Martin Heidegger and Lao-Tzu are ,not satisfied to infer to Being 
or Tao, but are concerned with underst~ding the ground of Being or 
'' Tao in itself and in recogni,zing the true human being ( or authenticity) 
through metaphysical experience. Thus, Heidegger and'Lao-Tzu have un-
traditional attitudes toward answering the question of Being. For both 
Heidegger and Lao-Tzu the answer to the question "What is Being?", can 
be found in a revelation which includes Nothingness. 
How does it stand with Being? 
Generally, 'Oriental philosophical wisdom does not come under the 
heading,of knowledge gained through inferential processes. Wisdom is 
a special1zed learning directed to the attainment of a higher state of 
I 
being. The philosopher is called one whose nature has been transformed, 
reformed to a pattern of supernatural entity by enlightenment •. ,Lao-Tzu. 
is not an exception. He emphasizes intuition, naturality without ac-
tion, and quietude, which are called the nature of Tao. Through such 
real experiences, it is possible to know t~e nature of Tao. 
How is the concept of "Nothing" retated to Tao? 
Tao is immanent and yet transcendental. That means that all crea-
tures appearing in the world are the appearances of Tao. Tao is the 
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origin which produces all 9reatures and draws them toward it as a ter-
minus. Even though the phenomena of Tao are limited in space and time, 
Tao itself is absolutely beyond space and time. So Tao is wholly in-
dividual and yet is the source from which all multiplicity proceeds. 
It is free from all cont,radictions and separation. It is beyond the 
reach of all intellectual processes •. Tao is all-embracing, far-reach-
ing, never-changing, never-ceasing. But nobody knows how to refer to 
Tao in a language that would express what Tao refers to apart from the 
origin of all creatures, multiplicity. The term "nothing" is only a 
feeble attempt. The realm of the unknown ultimately is the realm of 
the unnamed. 
Lao-Tzu says the nature of nothing is like the following: 
What cannot be seen is called evanescent; 
What cannot be heard is called rarefied; 
What cannot be touched is called minute. 
These three cannot be fathomed and so they are 
confused and looked upon as one. 
Its upper part is not dazzling; 
Its lower part is not obscure. 
Dimly visible, it cannot be named 
And returns to that which is without substance. 
This is called the shape that has no shape, 
The image that is without substance. 
This is called indistinct and shadow;y. 
Go up to it and you will not see its head; 
Follow behind it and you will not see its rear. 
Hold fast to the way of antiquity 
In order to keep in control the realm of today. 
The ability to know the beginning of antiquit1 
Is called the thread running ,through the way. 
This passage describes the nature of nothing, the one individual whole 
capable of accommodating both of our perceptual opposites. It says 
that the individual whole does not vary with changes in our perception 
of it; it evades all our sense of spatial perspective. Its essence 
and brightness remain always the same to us. It rules .the past and 
dominates the present as the master of history. There is no suitable 
name for it. Especially in the individual whole, it happens to compre-
hend the opposites of all perceptual phenomena. We are impressed with 
the fact that it is imperceptible or more comprehending than our per-
caption. We are impressed with its mystery containing the source of 
our perceptions. 
If we examine the whole of Chapter 14, !!2. ~ Chi!![, as to the one 
' I . .J 
indivisible whole, negative terms a.re mainly used: 11fo.rmless," "without 
substance" and "infinite." But -fhe clearest expression is "retu!ns to 
that which is without substance." If all creatures return to that 
which is without substance, then something unnamed exists antecedently . . 
to.all creatureso The wholeness :is not to change itself. Change is 
for a part, not for the whole. Lao-Tzu believes that the one indivisi-
' ' 
ble whole, nothing, never changes. The part~ return to that ."which is 
without substance (nothingness)." 
Because of its imperceptibility and indescribability, Lao-Tzu him-
self finds it difficult to give a name to the paradoxical whole. So 
he says; 
There is a thing confusedly formed, 
Born before heaven and earth. 
Silent and void 
It sta.hds alone and does not change, 
Goes round and does not wearyo 
It is capable of being the m~r of the world 
I know not it~_name 2 
So I style it -'the waJ 0 (Tao). 
Here the word "Tao" is not an indicative noun, but a symbol pointing 
I; 
out the paradoxical whole. "Tao" is the name given to "that which was 
originally nameless" or ttwhich is without substance." The entity of 
the paradoxical whole remains nameless (Nothingness) or not possible 
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to be named. This is "Nothingness." Because Tao has simplicity,. no-
action and quietness, it seems that It does not have a form of exis-
tence. Moreover, Tao is not statically still, but dynamic,lly powerful. 
Something is moving in Tao. 
Tao, nevertheless, does net.move vi.olently but in a weak and gen-
'-
tle manner. It works so faintly that its movement is hardly felt.or 
I . 
noticeable. What Tao accomplishes is not done purposefully, but is 
simply spontaneous. 
Chapter 42 reveals to us another meaning of Tao in the~ Te 
Ching. Tao is understood to be the first principle of all things. Tao 
cannot be itself a thing in the wa:y that all creatures are things. Tao 
is not an object, and ma:y be spoken of as "the ~ameless·, (mm-being) •11 
. . . ", . 
Nothing(,!'!!:) is non-being because it is a gentle ~eflexive motion that 
gives.birth to all things in the world. In the Tao!!!, Ching, Tao is 
indefinable, namel~ss, shape of no-s~ape, sign of no-thing, illusive 
and evasive (Ch. 14). 
In the sense that Tao is a motion, Nothingness embraces all and 
I 
excludes none (ch: 27, 62), never withdraws itself. Nothingness is 
. ; L I j· 
beyond opening and developing one's consciousness (Ch. 24, 47, 52), 
beyond making distinctions and limitation. 
Therefore the concept of nothingness in Lao-Tzu is different from 
the ordinary contrast, non-being as opposed to being. Nothingness, 
expressing the inner essence of Tao, is the constant wa:y. Nothingness 
signifies a reality be~ind the origin of the universe, and a principle 
of order. 
Heidegger als-o was concerned with the perspective within which 
Being itself may be found. He sa:ys, 
••• presence sp~aks in all metaphysical concepts of Being, 
sp.aaks in alil determinations., of Being. Even th~ ground as 
what alree.ccy lies prese·17,~, as what underlies, leads, when 
consider$d in itself ·to lasting, enduring, to time, to the 
present.3 
Thu·s the laying of the foundation as the projection of' ~ 
int:r;-insic possibility of metaphysics is necessarily a letting 
become lffective of the supporting pow~r of the established 
ground. , 
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From the above statements, we can discover,some sue;gestions for under-
.•• · I, 
standing.Being, especially different attitudes from the traditional ex-
planation of metaphysics. Traditional metaphysics deals with.thie»re-
lation between a branch and a root in a tree. In order to explain the 
branch of tree, the spec,ulative Western European thinkers have been 
• . . I 
' 
· content to dig out its root as cle,arly ~s possible. But what, Heidegger 
I . .. ' . 
asks, is the ground in which m~taphysics is rooted? The unequivocal 
answer is "Being." 
. ' 
Being can be called, then, the ground in whiph metaphysics, as the 
root of the tree of philosophy, is held fast and nourished. To in-
1... ' 
terrogate the ground of metaphysics, Heidegger changed the style of the 
fundamental question, the question about the sense of Being.5 Being 
L I .J 
means to be confined "within the sphere of actuality and presence, of 
6 permanence and duration, of abidingiµld occurrence." 
The .question of Being requires the building of a new metaphysics 
by surpassing traditional metaphysics. The new metaphysics does not 
ask about the constitution of ontology separated from the ontic ground 
of Being. To think Being, according to Heidegger, explicitly requires 
., L· , : 
us to relinquish Being as ihe gro'q.Ild .of beings ••• in favor Qf B&ing. 7 
Heidegger is the thinker o,f Being. Always the:r,e, ;is .Bei.ng which 
' . 
reveals itself. This is t~;Il'X'~p:~~· on which He.idegg~r has concentrat.ed. 
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In fact, his whole account of Being (Sein), according to Magda King, 8 
1 1, _I ' 
consists in an ana,lysis of the Greek term for "infinitive" in conjunc-
tion with his vie,J o~ the Greek conception qf Beingo Being in Heidegger 
means "constancy," "permanence," "presel').ce. 11 But it means also ''a let-
I . · .. 4lfllll, 
ting become effective of the supporting power of the e:s.tablished ground." 
It means ''what stands or takes a stand." ''Being is not. There is. It 
gives Being as the unconcealing of pr~sencing. 11 9 
To quote Heidegger's opinion: 
What actually has being is accordingly what always is, 'aei 
.2!!· I Permanently present is what we. must go back to in com-
prehending and producing: the model, the 'idea. 1 Parma.:... 
nently present is what we must go back to in all 'logos, 1 
statement; it is wh~t lies-before, 1 hypokeimenon, 1 'sub,;.. 
jectum. 9 10 
The four divisiors characterizing the question of Being in Heidegger 
I 
I have a.lose paral,lels i~ Laq-Tzu I s Tao. Sqme explanations for Lao-Tzµl s 
. I ' 
Tao have been given already: La·o-Tzu h~s pointed out "permanence, 11 
11unchanging 9 " 11 which is actually there" and "as what ought to be." 
Metaphysics in Heidegger and Lao-Tzu seems to think Being as that 
to .which all beings belong. Si~ce the beginning of philosophy the 
Being of beings has been sh~wn in a sense as the ground. The ground 
is that from which beings as such are what they are in their becoming, 
perishing and persisting as something that can be known, handled and 
worked upon. As the ground, Being brings beings to.their actual pre-
sencing. In accordance with the actual kind of presence (beings), the 
ground has the character of grounding as· 
the ontic causation of the real, as the transcendental making 
possible of the objectivity of objects, as the dialectical 
mediation of the movement· of the absolute Spirit, of the his-
torical process of production, as the will to power positing 
values.11 
There is ~ ontological difference bet.ween Being and beings, since 
the function of Being is simp.ly to enlighten beings. It gives being. 
In and through this letting, ( this giving) presencing is admi t'ted to-
that to which it belongs. "This letting" is intrinsic to its very 
' ' 
nature. Being is oriented to us through the negative term "not" (hid-
denness). Heidegger has meditated the sense of "not" (hiddenness) in 
What is Metaphysics? Therefore the meditation of the hiddenness (not) 
I 
of Being in beings is for him an essential part of his experience of 
.. Being itself. Being is disclosure through the experience of Being. 
The experience of Being,is not logical. Heidegger transcends logic 
because the question of Being·is itself, "a mode of thinking which, 
instead of supplying,c~ncepts merely, feels and tests itself as a new 
mode of relationship to Being. 1112 Heidegger, at first, is seeking for 
the significance involved in the "Not" (Nothingne·ss) on the groun,d of 
Meta-metaphysics (der Metaphysik der Metaphysik). Even if overcoming 
the traditional metaphysics means.?!:eta-metaphysics, every question in 
, :._; I I 
Meta-metaphysics always covers· the whole range of metaphysical 
13 problems. 
There are two problems requiring our consideration compa:r;~ng 
Heidegger and Lao-Tzu with traditional metaphysics and-its logic. Need-
less to say, the question of Being in Heidegger and Lao-Tzu requires us 
to reexamine two established attitudes of philosophy, that is, the 
change of traditional logic and the rejection of; traditional metaphysics. 
Bri,efly. speaking, me.ta-metaphysics in Heidegger means the total 
r~-interpretation of the ground of logic forrnulating traditional meta-
. j 
physics. 14 It means the revolution of metaphysics.. Because Heidegger's 
'thinking is related to the truth of Being, he turns from the limits of 
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traditional metaphysics. "To turn away from" means "to return to the 
ground of metaphysics" in the other dimension of metaphysics~ In other 
words, it [the turning] may continually swing back again to the ground-, . 
question of metaphysics. 1115 To think Being is not associated with any 
·. 
area in metaphysics, but it is a result of pushing a straight continu-
ous line of questioning from the question of substance or essences be-
cause the question of Being has ,been asked by "going beyond the essence." 
And also "going beyond the essence" itself is metaphysics even if such 
a moving indicates the essence of what-is. 16 T~t is why Heidegger, 
instead of thinking of the so-called specific·a!eas in metaphysics, 
· attempts to ask about their wholeness; that is, 
metaphysics is an enquiry over and above what-is, with a view 
to winning it back again ~s such and in totality for our 
understanding.17 · 
The new direction of metaphysics originated in "going beyond the 
essences" will go toward Being, Nothingness. 
But Heidegger's thinking has been against logic. He says, 
Thought is, more simply 9 thought of Being. The genitive has 
two meanings. Thought is of Being, insofar as thought, even-
tuated by Being, belongs to Being~ Thought is at the same 
time thought of Being insofar as thought listens to, heeds, 
Being.18 
What he means is that thinking only dealing with rules of logic cannot 
recognize the purpose or point to the hiddenness behind the question 
of Being. In fact, according to Heidegger, "logic began to be estab-
lished when Greek philosophy had come to its end. 1119 When the essence 
of Being became the object of knowledge, logic appeared as an affair 
. I 
of organization and technique on the stage of philosophy. In spite of 
the fact that science ·has investigate~ deeply the ground of entities by 
the methods of logic, its methods of discovering Being, unfortunately, 
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could not accomplish its purpose. Because Being as the ground of en-
tities exists not only as a quality of what-is, it also cannot be con-
,·. 
ceived and esta~lished objecti"{elyo t•No logic can grasp truth of a 
th 'nk' ,,20 l. ' l.~o 
., 
Does Heidegger mean that the challenge to logic is the entire 
I ·. I,. 
negation of logic, or ·the substitution of aa_illogical method for it? 
His challenge does not mean to negate a log~l conception or categor-
ies, but to criticize the groundless intellectual trick based on "ratio." 
. ~. ' .,,. 
In fact, as Heidegger's system itself indicated, he is not irrationa-
l ·21 
listic although he might be misunderstood as a.ii irrationalist. He 
SaJl'St 
to surpass the traditional logic does not mean elimination, 
of thought and.the dqinination of sheer feeling; it means 
more radical~ stricter speaking, a thinking that is a part 
and parcel of being.22 
Thinking as opposed to logic would rather point to considering the,.true 
essence in logic rather than to fighting desperately for something ir~ 
rational. Heidegger's way of thinking must be separated from the sirn-
. I 
ple mysticism dealing with feeling as opposed to logic. 
In Heidegge!r' s opinion, the object of metaphysical thought is not 
'· . 
~he essant (the beings) but Being (Being of the beings), so it is ob-
viously true to surpass the way of t~adition~~ logic which shackles 
' ' thought under the definite established laws of _the .essent ( the beings) o 
,, 
ooothe whole body of logic as it is known to us, ••• is 
grounded in a very definite answer to the question about the 
· essent ( the beings); perhaps, in consequences, all thinking 
which solely follows the laws of thought prescribed by tra-
.ditional logi~ is incapable o •• of understanding the ques-
tion about the essent by its own resources ••• 23 
By surpassing the traditional logic Heidegger tries to get the essential 
answer from a renewed consideration of logic; in other words, 
The animus against log~c ••• derives from the knowledge of 
that thinking which has its source not in the observation 
of the objectivity of what-is, but in the e~perience of the 
truth of Being.24 
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Through the experience of the truth of Being (Nothingness) the question 
of what Being is can ?e answered. The new direction of metaphysics is 
to analyze and interpret the meanings involved in Being through respond-
ing to Beingo Therefore the meta-metaphysics is to search out or exa-
mine what has been involved in resp9nding to Being. 
The question o~ Being and Tao in Heidegger and Lao-Tzu is the 
question of Nothingness. In Heidegger as well as in Lao-Tzu Being as 
the tree root to the essent (the beings) can be compared only with 
nothingness. When it is possible to think of Being by negating the 
essent (the .~s), Nothingness becom~s the source of negation of the 
. ' 
what-is-to~ality. Nothingness is neither an annihilation of what-is, 
nor does it spring from negation. Nothingness nihilates of its~lf. 
Nothingness is more original than the Not and Negation. 25 Nothingness 
does not play the role of connection bridging the gap between the beings 
- 1' l I 
and Beingo For Heidegge~ it is not acceptable only to ask what Noth-,. 
ingness is in itself as traditional metaphysics has asked and observe 
the objectivity of what-is through 11 the law of thought prescriped by 
traditional logic." Whoever does not have any- experience of the es-
senc~ of Being (according to both Heidegger and Lao-Tzu) may think 
only of Nothingness as negative. It is hard to know the positive sig-
nificance in Nothingness. But through the complete negation of the 
, .. 
totality of the ~eings, the positive significance of Nothingness can 
be known. 
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Nothingness and the Origin of the Universe ' . . 
The conception of Nothingness in Heidegger and Lao-Tzu has been 
treated in relation to Being (or Tao). I have already indicated that 
the new metaphysical question of Being is like that of Nothingness. 
The question of Nothingness is the annihilation of the what-is-
totality in order to understand Being in itself. Heidegger says, 
"Nothingness is the negation. of the totality of what-is: Nothing is 
not something which is,absolutely not. 1126 
In this s~ction, I would like to explain the Ground of the .Uni-
verse in relatiop to Nothingness. That is to say, in order to under-
stand the. question of Being, one, at least, must think of the ground 
. to establ_ish the whole field of metaphysics. Nothingness is said to 
be something underlying a~ substratum to support Being of what-is-
!' I . t-·_! 
totality._ Heidegger says that "Nothingness is that which makes the 
! : 
revelation of what-is as such possible for our ·human existence. 1127 
The questio:ri.of Nothing pervades the whole of metaphysics 
only because it forces8us to face the problem of the 
origin of negation ••• 2 
In other words, the question of Nothingness is "that which makes the 
revelation of what-is.ao possible," "pervades the whole of metaphysics 
a••" These statements have the o~tological significance directed to-
ward describing the universe. Heidegger himself in~ is Metaphysics? 
did not accept two propositions: "liothing comes from Nothingness, 11 
"The created being is made out of nothing. 1129 
The concept of Nothing Us'1jlally has been described as the opposite 
concept to what-is-totality, or as the negation of entities. Nothing-
ness has bee~ used negatively to define Being. In other words, .Being 
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iost its own opportunity to be examined for itself. Through the means· 
' ,' 
of another entity, Being may be defined. For instance, with regard to 
the question, "Who am I?", I. answer that I am n~t John, not Mike. 
Through borrowing the concept of n~thing, Be~~ can be define~ •. An 
a.ttempt,to ans~er the question of Being or Ground itself has never peen 
ma,de before. 
Fortunately Heidegger. tried to 1i-seek the meaning of Nothingness by 
which most of us kriow eritities. Nothingness is defined as the Other 
' :I,. 
to wh~t-is-totality. He .says, "Nothing, conceived as the pure "Other" 
that what is, is the veil of.Being. 1130 Heidegger seems to recognize 
' tha:t Nothingness has been entirely rejected by science and becolll!ls 
' . 
abandoned as null and void. 
Wha"ti does he mean by t 1the veil of Being?" Literally, the veil 
·) . 
meani:3 something which. hides •the real face. Whosoever is excessively 
attached to the veil, cannot see the real face. But the veil may ,give 
u.s a hint of an object behind i t·s own self. · Whoever does not get the 
' . 
hint, cannot recognize the existence o,f the object. And whoever em-
_phasizes·1 the veil itself, cannot recognize the exi~tence of Being. To 
whoever considers Nothingness as a simple nothing, Nothingness really 
becomes null and void. Asking about Being covered with the veil is . 
the same as being projected into Nothingness. 
Nothingness is the Other to what-is, and has been identified with 
Being behind the veilc That is why Nothingness in Heidegger is sharply 
different from nihilistic thought. Nothingness is not pure logical 
negation or empty, but Other to what~is-totality. Without Nothingness, 
the question of the Being of what-is-totality cannot be asked in order 
to establish the principle of identity and the principle of sufficient 
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reason. So Heidegger says, "Pure Being and Pure Nothing are thus one 
and the same. 1131 
Being and Nothing hang together, but not because the two 
things ••• are one in their indefiniteness and immediate.r 
ness, but because Being itself is finite in essence and 
is only revealed·. in the tra:Q.scendence of Dase in as pro-
jected into Noth±ng.32 
Being and Nothingness are not identified in a dialetical leap of 
thought like the relation between thesis and antithesis in Hegel. 
Rather Heidegger tells us to experience the truth of Being. 33 In i;~e 
book,~ is Metap;hysics?, he has tolq. us to expe1;ience the w,arld of 
Bei;ns:. To experience the world of Being is,tp characterize the dialec-
tic relation between Being and Dasein. 
To the degree that we degrade this essential dread that the 
relationship .cleared within it for Man to Being, we demean 
the essence of courage. Courage can endure Nothing: it 
knows; in . the abyss of terror, the'. all but untrodden region 
that 'is' returns into 'what' it is and is able to be.34 
' ' 
To experience the 'world of Being means to listen to the word of Being. 
In Heidegger 8 s philosophy, listening to the word of Being has been 
very much emphasized, and also to obey t'h'9 .word of Being which me!itns 
to turn back to the fundamental ground for all laws. In relation to 
going beyond the limitation of reason, he might be called irrational. 
However, through experience of Being, Heidegger has found the essence 
of Nothingness in o;rder to solve the ground of what-is-totality. 
In Lao=Tzu the c0ncept of Tao (Way) has been explained as the ulti-
mate Being which produces the universe. Tao is no longer the way of 
' -
something existing objectively, but a completely independent entity, 
and has replaced the religious God i.n all functions. 
Actually the concept of Hea~en in Chinese culture was known as 
the creator of the universe or as the superintendent for fortune and 
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misfortune in man. 35 Whoever wants to understand Chinese philosophy, 
has to understand the conc~pt of Heaven. In Lao-Tzu the concept of 
Heaven remains central in his thought as a means of d.eacribing Tao. He 
puts emphasis on the priority of the mo.re ultimate Being, Tao as the 
cause of Heaveno In other words, t_he ultimate Being proceeds to give 
attributes to the universe. But this 11 the ultimate Being" is beyond 
the categories of human reason according to La-o-Tzu, as has been ex-
plained in regard to man's lack of percept1.1-al understanding of Tao. 
The ultimate Being cannot be experienced through the senses of the hu-
man being. It is impossible for the ultimate Being to be definitely 
named and also to be put into the form of conceptio~s. For the form 
of concept related to senses is not worthy to be called the ultimate 
Being. Lao-Tzu. says, "This called the. shape that has no shape, Tte 
image that is without substance" ( Ch. 14). The scientifi.c attitude is 
not qualified to explain the ultimate Being. "Thew~ that cube 
spoken of is not the constant," (Ch. 1) "DEi.--fkly visible, it orily seems 
as if it were those. I know not whose it is. It images the forefather 
of God" (Ch.·4). In the religious sense, Lao-Tzu neglects the creative 
power of God, the absoluteness and the infinite. Tao has replaced God 
as the ultimate cause of the universe, given attributes of gods and 
heaven. For Tao exists before separation of the subject and the object, 
that is, beyond the r~lative discr~mination. Tao existed by itself 
, . . ' ·, I ;_ • 
before developing into forms and having qualities. To get forms_and 
qualities means to have intentionality or purpose. Tao does not have 
any intentionality or purposeful nature in itself. Fung Yu-Lan says, 
"Wha't Tao accomplishes is not done purposefully but is simply spon-
taneously so. 36 
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Therefore, Tao means, metaphysically, that "for the universe to have 
' ' ' 
come into being, there must exist an all-embracing first prinoiple. 1137 
How does Lao-Tzu explain '1,1.ao? Tao, accordi~ to him, consists of 
evanescent, rarefied, and minute., 
What cannot be seen is called evanescent; what cannot be 
heard is called rarefied; what cannot be touched is called 
minute. These three ca.nnot be· fathgmed and so they are 
confused and.looked upon as one ••• 3 
The characters of Tao in the above statements can be said to be beyond 
the limitation of sense~. But Tao seems also to be known through ex-
perience of intuition and quietude, not through intellectual analysis. 
Intellectual analysis informs us of things as the manifestation of Tao. 
At the same time, Tao is "What has brought the universe into being, 1139 
and in one way it ma;y also be said to be Being. Therefore Lao-Tzu 
sa;ys, 
oooHence a.lwa;ys rid yourself of desire in order to observe 
its secrets (Tao's internal); but always allow yourself to 
have desires in .. order to observe its manifestation (Tao's 
external) .40 
The method of understanding the world of external manifestations cam).o,t 
be adjusted to observing Tao 0 s internal secrets. The analysis of mani-
festations cannot be used to unders~and the secret of Nothingness. 
The reason is~ 
There is a thing confusedly formed. Born before heaven and 
earth. Silent and void, It stands alone and does not change. 
Goes around and does not weary. It is capable of being the 
mother of the world. I know not its name. So I style it the 
Way (Tao) ••• 41 
Tao can be referred to both as Being (beings) and non-Being 
(Nothingness). 
To whosoever has the rational, perceptual or scientific attitude, 
Nothingness as Tao could be explained as analogous to empty or void 
space. There are statements given to such a scholar in the~~ 
Ching. Lao-Tzu says~ 
Tao (the Way) begets one, one begets two, two begets three, 
three begets the ten tho.usand (i.e., infinite number of). 
things. The ten thousand things support the Yin and embrace 
the Yang. It is on the blending of the breaths that their 
harmony depends.42 
Heaven and Earth and the ten thousand things are produced 
from Being; Being ~s the product of non-Being.43 
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Tao is Nothingnesso But it signifies some special meaning; that 
is, this does not mean only ~on-~eing as opposed to the lfi:ng of ma~. 
. ·,<' ' 44 
terial objectsi bµt also what is not 1even ideally, "a mere Zero" or 
. . I ' 
Nothingness. Nothingness is the supreme stillness and the ultimate 
I 
origin of the Universe. Here beeau-ee of the impossibility of expre~-
sion in the language, L~.o--Tz.ti. has said that Tao is "shadowy. and indis-
tincrt" or Nothingness. That is because· all names have the influence · 
of limitation and determination, as already mentioned. "Tao is eter-
nally nameless" ( Ch. 42), "Tao is concealed in the nameless" ( Ch. 41). 
Tao, nevertheless, is said to pervade the concrete world cease-
lessly. Tad as Nothingness can be the mother of the phenomenal world. 
But Lao-Tzfi does not put any emphasis on the causal origin of the world 
I' 
because cause and effect themselves belong to the phenomenal order of 
the uni verse. ··What he wants to do is to relate Nothingness and the 
universe in such a way that the universe is seen as originated in No-
thingness, but not by means of any physical causality or as physically 
' 
caused by Nothingness. And Lao-Tzu goes on to elaborate the effect of 
Nothingne,ss upon the universe. through indicating how all things exist 
through Nothingness or oneness. 
Of all, these came to be in possession of the one; 
Heaven in yirtue of the one is 1impid; 
Earth in virtue of .the one is settled; , 
Gods in virtue oft.he one have their potencies; 
The valley in virtue of the one is full; 
the myriad creatUires, in virtue of the one are alive; 
Lords and prince~ in virtue of the one become leaderA 
in the empire. It is the one that makes these what 
they are.45 ' 
The statement show1;1 us the idea that Tao pervades all the strata. of 
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the universe including the divine. And it helps us to understand how 
Fung Yu-Lan explained "Tao be'ing the first all-embracing principle. 1146 
Here we have to bear in mind as a side issue that the order of strati-
fication in Nothingness proceeds from Nothingness to heaven, earth, 
valley and the living creatures. 
There are some similar poin~s made by Heidegger and Lao-T~u 'in 
Nothingness. It is not difficult to compare the common attributes in 
Nothingness between them. 
Nothingness and the Process .. of the Uni verse 
As already mentioned in the ~bove, for Heidegger Nothingness is· 
" 
not an independent, entity, but ~ather the nihilation of the what-is-
totality in order to understand Being in itself. In other words, 
Nothingness does not appear as 1 something that we can think. Because 
we cannot conceive of Nothingness as an entity, we should not attempt 
to formulate propositions about it as an object of thought. 
The Nothingness is the condition of the what-is revealing itself 
as such, that is, the condition of the being of the what-is and not 
the nothingo As Heidegger mentioned, 
Only in the clear night of dread' s Nothingness is wha_t-is 
as such revealed in all its original overtness: that it 
'is' and is not Nothing.47 
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This openness revealed alone is what makes it possible for the what-is 
as a whole--including man--to be revealed to the specifically human 
kind of Being. Thus the Nothingness does not afford us the opposite 
concept to the what-is. The Nothingness has no separate existence, 
and it belongs to the essence of Being itself(~ Wesen des Seins 
selbst). The essence .of Being can be perceiyed through the process of 
appearing. Nothingness renders possible the manifestation of beings 
as beings. This is precisely the function of Being itself. Heidegger 
says, "Nothingness is that which makes the revelation of what-is as 
' 
such possib:).e for our human existence.,A8 Let us think of a bowl. If 
the bowl is full of some entities, the bowl itself would not be used 
any more to carry other things. But when the bowl is empty (Nothing-
ness), the bowl is able to have an opportunity to be used or to be 
valued. The state of being empty (Nothingness) can be said to bring 
the bowl itself into unconcealment. The bowl itself needs Nothingness 
for its own self-existence or for its own self-preservation, but also 
plays a role like the ground of Nothingness. When the empty bowl is 
full of something (Nothingness has disappeared), the bowl itself as 
Being of the bowl can be named as what it ;i.so By making Nothingness 
null, Being lets what-is be what-iso In other words, Nothingness ex-
ists as the essence of Beingo Heidegger says, "Nothing ceases to be 
the vague opposite of what-is: it now reveals itself as integral to 
the Being of what-is.,.49 So, Nothingness not only is "the veil of 
Being"50 for what-is-totality, but also essentially exists as Being 
itself. In other words, Heidegger understands Being and Nothingness 
to be one.51 
In Heidegger 1 s 9pinion, the concept of Nothingness is not a simple 
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nothing which indicates some indefinite material. Nothingness is not 
entirely like something producing the disharmonious contradictory to 
Being.52 There is a qualitative same and a different aspect between 
Being and Nothing. 
Being and Nothingness is a mixture, but also both are synonymous 
terms as Lao-Tzu says, "two are the same but diverge in name as they 
issue forth'! 1 (Ch •.. 1). Nothingness is not a counter-concept, but a 
i 
function of Being. Everything in the world has its own originality of 
self-identity in the conc~pt of Nothingness. The concept of Nothing-
ness can be the fundamental principle capable of guaranteeing self-
identities of entities. The openness of Nothingness lies at the basis 
of all wonder as the ultimate origin. With the revelation of Nothing-
ness is disclosed ~ntological truth, and an effort to answer the ques-
tion about Nothingness is an endeavour to meditate Being in its. truth. 
In Chapter 42 of ~ !! Ching,, Lao-Tzu exJ?lains the productive 
process of the universe in relation to Nothingness. He says; 
The Way begets one; One begets two; Two begets three; Three 
begets the myriad creatures; 'the myriad creatures carry on 
their backs the Yin and embrace in their arms the Yang and 
are the blending of the generative force of the two. 
This passage explains not only the nature of Tao but also the relation 
of Tao with the universe.53 
One in the passage means Tao or the identity of opposites. The 
"one" generates 11 two," the pair of opposites inherent in the identity. 
The 11 two" oppos.i tes together with, the identity give a numerical total 
of 11 three. 11 All things, generated from the "three," are made of Yin 
and Yang, a pair of opposites, which are comprehended in one supreme 
harmony. These statements explain that Tao gives rise to the womb of 
the mother, that the universe is born from that of the mysterious female, 
The passage presents a picturesque way of describing how the universe 
came to appear concretely. Lao-Tzu's presentation of Tao's creation 
is, of course, very ambiguous and abstract. Because of this condition, 
Lao-Tzu was misunderstood, as if the problem of creation had not been 
dealt with by Lao-Tzu. In some sense, Heidegger also does not give any 
description of how the world of beings (Seienden) comes to be from 
Being, though it is not clear why. 
Tao is called the generative force (full force), which means the 
vital force involving the harmony of Yin and Yang. The full force is 
fundamentally like an additive state of the power of movement and re-
pose. The state can be divided into the Yin and the Yang by moving 
the power. Because the Yin and the Yang are originated in the genera-
tive force, they are not individually the divided separate entities. 
That is, the external movement among them is different from their in-
ternal relation with Tao. The movement of Tao becomes the Yang, and 
its stillness becomes the Yin. In other words, nothing as the energy 
of harmony including the Yin and Yang existed anteeedently before being 
divided into two parts. The concept of Nothingness might be compared 
to the concept of Energy as force of the universe. However, energy is 
not physical force, but function or life-movement in a metaphysical 
senseo That is why Lao-Tzu says that Tao has three characteristics: 
not to be seen, not to be heard and not to be caught. These are mixed 
into one entity 9 Taoo How is such a mixture called? Lao-Tzu calls it 
"Nothingnesso 11 What is Nothi'ngness like? It is like an ecstasy. A:ny 
linguistic expression for it is not available. Because of these con-
ditions Lao-Tzu refers to or calls it, "Nothingness:" "This is called 
the shape that has not shape, 11 "The image that is without substance,'' 
11The spirit of the valley," "The mysterious female," "The great image." 
Of course, those terms refer to the difficulty in describing Tao as an 
object of knowledge. Hence Lao-Tzu suggests to us that we need an 
11 empty mind," 11 the state of setting always free from desire,'' if we 
want to observe Nothingness as the principle of heaven and earth. 
As the process of the universe was indicated in the above 9 Tao 
here is known as Nothingness, the ultimate beginning. The moment of 
,change itself through the movement . of Nothingness is called one; so 
calledv it is the 'great axis of the universe. The great axis has Yin 
' ' 
and Yang capable of producing three.54 The three indicates energyi 
' ' 
shape (form) and matter. According to Chu Tzu, something uniting, 
maintaining, and supporting Yin and Y~ is energy, the great axis of 
the uni verse. The Yin and Yang can pl'oduce all creatures. Therefore, 
Tao as Nothingness really exists and becomes the ultimate principle of 
all creatures. Tao~ thoughv does not depend for its existence on some 
previous condition or ~vent.55 
Nothingness produces movement of the myriad creatures, but never 
iseparates itself from the universe. On the surface Nothingness seems 
to produce no-acting because of our limited scope of knowledge, but 
the movement therein is ceaseless like the momentum of continuous force. 
Lao7 Tzu says v 
The way is broad, reaching left. as well as rightc The myriad 
creatures depend on it for life yet it claims no authority. 
It accomplishes its task yet lays claim to no merit. It 
clothes and feeds the ~riad creatures yet lays no claim 
to being their master.5 
The principle p,roducing the universe is Nothingness as the essence of 
Tao. The universe consists of one, two, and three: Energy, Yin and· 
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Yang, \physical force, form and matter. These are produced from the 
foundation of the movement of Nothingness. But no man can recognize 
its action. Its movement is natural, not artificial. Opposing the 
artificial technique of human beings~ Lao-Tzu advises us to act ac-
car.ding to our natural inclination or according to the rule of nature 
\ • I ' 
as it is. If we push ourselves into the deep experience, of Tao by 
I 
.J 
uniting with and experiencing Noth.ingness, we can find that Lao-Tzu 
does not neglect or d~spise human effort at all. Only art}ficial 
thought, which draws man away frotn the source of his Being, was ner 
glected by Lao-Tzu. But one should use his mental activity to follow 
the principle of Tao • 
. .: Heidegger suggests how to understand Being: listening to the 
voice of Being. This signifies the establishment of the encounter be-
tween human existence and Being. Whis is done by ''corresponding to 
the call of Being." What does "corresponding to the call" mean? It 
means to call Dasein -into Be~;ng or to_open Being to Dasein. Heidegger 
says, "the call comes from me and yet from beyond me and over me. 1157 
Who calls in me? The answer is: 
the· caller is Dasein in its uncanniness; pri~ordial, thrown 
Being-in-the-world as the 0not-at-home'--the bare 'that-it-
is O in the , 0 no.thing O • of the world. The caller is unfamiliar 
to the ~verydsy they-self; It is something like an alien 
voice.5 
What does the caller say to the called? 
Taken strictly, nothing. The caller asserts nothing, gives 
no information about world-events, has nothing t'o tell.59 
How does the caller represent i t1:3elf? 
Conscience manifests itself as the c~ll of care: the caller 
is Dasein, which, in its thrownness (in its ~8ing-already-in), 
is anxious about its potentiali ty-f o:r-Being. · 
So, to experience Being g~ves pleasure and a sufficient ground 
for human thinking. Philosophical thought in Heidegger meanfftnot 
to be satisfied in knowing the inferential d~rived from the ground of 
Being, but to be satisfied in understanding the ground of Being itself 
as well as finding the true· self of the human being. 
Therefore in La.o~Tzu and Heidegger the essence of man is existence 
into the openness of Being. Since Being implies Nothingness, this 
existence of man is "be,ing, projected into Nothingness. 1161 As far as 
man is the place of Beihg' s coming into ope~e'ss, he is the place to 
make Nothing null. The relation of man to Nothingness is not merely a 
relation in which.. man thinks nothingness; as being-held-in-nothingness, 
he exists in the midst of it. He is the tenant of Nothingness. 
Nothingness and the Virtue of Human Nature 
It has been the fact that Heidegger and Lao-Tzu have thought es-
, 
sentially of the question of Being and Tao in metaphysical aspects: 
the origin of the Universe and its process. In order to develop their 
theories of the-question of Being and Tao, my first concern was to exa-
mine their methodological attitude to get the answer. This essay tried 
to show the meta-metaphysics and the challenge to the traditional 
', 
logic in each thinkero 
There is yet an important point to which we have to pay attention: 
through the expl~tion of Being and Tao, how to live in the world has 
been shown to us, or how to live our lives has been answered. In Lao-
Tzu, Tao is said to serve sufficiently to indicate its essentially 
practical motive in relation to virtue. In Heidegger, it is not easy 
to find his theory of virtue. Being in itself, as.already indicated, 
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has an ontical priority, but Dasein plays the role of a window to open 
or disclose .the meaning of Being. In other words man's understandi.ng 
of Being is not an isolated faculty, nor merely a part in Dasein, but 
is formulated through the whole way of human Dasein. ·Probably "Man's 
' . 
way to be is to live, ••• Man's way to being is to understand Being. 1162 
Heidegger srors; 
The 'essence' of Dasein lies in its existence. Accordingly 
those characteristics which can be exhibited in this e~tity 
are not 'properties'. present-at-hand of some entity lhich 
'looks' so and so 'and is itself present-at-hand; ••• 3 
"Virtue" in this discussion refers to. the character of human ex-
istence. Virtue is something which should be in a human as a person 
because of what they are authentically and not because of artificial 
training.; $0 Lao-Tzu uses the term, Te (Virtue) to indicate natural, 
instinctive, primitive qualities as opposed to those joined to man by 
social training and education. Virtue is, according to Lao-Tzu, that 
one should be in harmony with the fundamental law of the universe. The 
verse 11 the named was the mother of the reyriad creatures" is the clue to 
how to explain the relation between Tao and the world. Lao-Tzu oonsi-
ders "always allow oneself to have desires" as the appearance of human 
nature. Lao-Tzu character~zes the living-condi~~on as the basis of 
"following Tao." It is understandable that Lao-Tzu attempted, at first, 
to employ metaphysical speculation and reystical insight before he could 
find a basis for this way of life. 
But in Heidegger human existence is how to reflect or echo the 
voice of Bei~ in itself. The soundless voice of Being is the word of 
Being, capable of revealing or opening Being in more detail. The word 
of Being is the foundation in which the essence of Being has been 
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opened. "To echo" means to respond or to answer or to listen to the 
soundless voice of Being. "To listen to".is experience which expresses 
its contents with the language, not only available in words, but also 
in silence. Expression, wha;tever it is, is emphasized to open clearly 
the essence of Being. 
Probably some .of us think of the virtue of human nature as prac-
tical utility for a society as well as for human life. But Heidegger 
and Lao-Tzu have a different view of virtue. 
In Lao-Tzu the natur~ of virtue should exist in a person or a 
thing by understanding how such a person or thing can be tied to Tao 
and can manifest Tao. His explanation of ,virtue originates in tlffl.;, na~ 
ture of Tao. 
Virtue is said to be the actual aspect of Tao. Virtue brings the 
opposites into one great harmony. In this sense, virtue would be a 
function of nothingness. In Lao-Tzu the true form of human nature has 
to be the following; 11Alw9¥s rid oneself of desires." In order to 
explain this, Iwould like to show the symbolized substantial character 
of Tao. 
Tao is like a vessel which, though empty, m9¥ be drawn upon 
endlessly. And never needs to be filled. So vast and deep 
(Ch. 4). 
Therefore in governing the people, the sage empties their 
minds (people O s mind) but f;ills their bellies (Ch. 3). 
The spirit of the valley never dies (Ch. 30). 
The point here is to empty one's mind. To empty one's mind is a method 
of turning back to Tao, the supreme goal of life. Because the attri-
butes of Tao are quietude, naturality without action, empty, Lao-Tzu 
bases his theory of ethics on the essence of Nothingness. In order to 
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return to Tao, one should prepare hie mind to transfer into his actual 
! 
life the .following points; humility, weaknesses, and knowledge of con-
tentme:nt or developed ability to be content. 
Know contentment 
And you will suffer no disgrace; 
Know when to stop 
And you will meet with no danger. 
You can then endure.64 
It is ,\UlderstandabJ,.e to counter man's natural tendenoif;)J3 by lms::wing 
contentment and knowing when to stop. Unless man e-:fI>eriences content-
ment, .. man cause~ himself to !illl;ffer from continous·discontentment. The 
' artificial rule for life, on the contrary, makes human beings fallen 
or discontent or ambitious. That is why Lao-Tzu SaJ'S that one should 
hold the three treasures: compassion, frugality, and not daring to 
take the lead in the empire (Ch. 67). This is how Lao-Tzu wants to 
explain the attributes of virtue related to Tao.. This concept of vir-
tue in Lao-Tzu differs from Confucius'~ (humanness). Jen indicates 
the relation between human beings in order to make a harmonious society 
by man's artificial efforts. But Tao indicates a different aspect. 
That is, 
The sage keeps to the deed that consists in taking no-action 
and pract1ces the teaching that uses'no words (Ch. 2)o 
In quality of mind it is depth that matters (Ch. 8) 
oo• returning to one's roots is known as stH~hess. (Ch. 16). 
These passages refer to the ·quiet character of mind and the potentia-
lity capable of being represented outside. Tao is the fundamental fea-
ture of emotion in mind. So Nothingness whicp. is the essence of the 
universe becomes the essential state of human nature~ The verse 11 hea-
ven and earth are ruthless, ••• the sage is ruthless" (Ch. 79) repre-





of mind in h~an n~ture that is one of stillness or absence of distinc-
' 
tions between subject and object is originated in Tao. Tao in itself 
is the state of absoluteness before subject and object are separated, 
but the appearance of Tao is relative to the distinction between op-
positeso The world of Tao as the appe~rance is like the following, 
'• I I 
Thus something and nothing produce each other; 
the difficult and the easy complement each other; 
the long and the short off~set each other; 
the high and the low incline towards each other; 
note and sound harmonize with each other; 
before and after follow each other. 05 
By explaining transcendence and relation in Tao, Lao-Tzu deals 
with the harmon,y of unification involving true and false, good and bad, 
beautiful and ugly in human nature. Especially v he says that "there-
fore the sage alwa_ys excels in saving people" (Ch. 27), so the sage, 
being beyond the relative, discriminative value, helps all creatures 
realize completely their own nature in TaoG The sage embraces both 
the good and the evil together in his heart. As a matter of fact, No-
thingness, transcending value-judgment, has nothing to classify as 
good and evilo The world that transcends value-judgment is difficult 
to be known by human perception. It resists the classificatory act of 
• ..
artificial reasono Lao-Tzu considers the relativity of the phenomenal 
world but always analyzes that world by the relation of the phenomenal 
t.o the absolute of Tao. The transcendental absolute of .. Tao is not 
separated from the phe:riomEUl~J,, b'ij;t the absolute of Tao controls and 
operates appearance in thE! worldo Lao-Tzu says continuously this is 
·how the sage differs from human beings, "Hence the sage knows himself 
but does no·t display himself, loves himself but does .not exalt him-
These are some virtues for self-realization or self-
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perfection. Even though the sage finds himself to be •,ae, he does 
not e"xpress it outsideo :e:e dCiles not represent hie own su.periori ty. to 
othereo The sage keeps always·three treasures in his mind: compas-
sion, frugalityp and concession. Without these three treasures, no-
body can be the sage of self-realization. Anybody who wants to be 
courageous, noble, and a leader, should mound his virtue on the basis 
' 
of Nothingnesso "Therefore the sage, while clad in homespun, c~nceals 
on his person a priceless piece of jadeo1167 The sage appears externally 
to make compromises with the non-sage but inside he has a precious 
jewel. His action is no-action, and he teaches without language. 
Therefore, even though the sage does not himself attempt to be great, 
he can be called great because he s,ucceeds in not attempting to be 
greato 
We remember that Dasein is projected in Being. That means not 
only to be born therein, but also to open or uncover the essence of 
Being. To open Being signifies uncovering the truly authentic Being. 
To be true means how much the authentic Being has been uncovered. 
' I 
True discourse uncovers the authentic potentiality of Dasein and thus 
lets it be seen as something no longer escapi.ng notice o The word for 
untrue, ''false discourse, 19 contains the notion of covering over, 
concealing. 
The authentic potentiality of Dasein was presupposed in the form-
ulation·of the analysis·of 11:Being-toward-death. 11 What is meant by the 
authentic Being-towards-death? ln order to testify to such apoten-
tialit;y of In-Being, three phenomena must be ontologically analysed: 
conscience, guj:lt, and resolveo 
The phenomenon of conscience allows us to see Dasein in its 
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authenticity. 68 Conscience discloses precisely to Dase in '~what he 
ought to be. 11 Conscience is the awareness of how Dasein is with it-
self. When Dasein primarily listens td others, Dasein not only depends 
on the illusion of the publicity, but also gains its unauthentic po-
tentiality of Being-in-the~world. But the voice of calling from the 
authentic self is necessary to the self lost in the "they." The voice 
of calling is conscience. Heidegger refuses to accept the common in-
terpretation of cbnseience, which means the presumed faculties of. the 
soul, intellect. 
The call of conscience is characterized as a mode of speech in 
the following ways: (1) what is spoken of is Dasein itself in its 
everydayness, (2) what is appeared to is one's Olfll self, (3) what is 
said in the call of conscience is "nothing," and conscience speaks in 
the mode of silence. In Heidegger, conscience is the call of care in 
human Daseino The call comes not from anyone else but from myself and 
upon myselfo Especially, Dasein 1 being placed in the ground of its 
anxiety, is the caller of conscience. The call speaks in the anxious 
mood of' silence to call the self back into the silence of the existent 
potentiality of Beingo In the call of conscience, Dasein can project 
itself to disclose its own potentiality of Being-in-the-world, but also 
l>asein understands its guilt, which means that Dasein owes to itself a 
debt. 
The basic ontological meaning of guilt is a lack of something. The 
r 
guilt is grounded in the facticity of Dasein (thrownness, fallenriess). 
After realizing the voice of calling, Dasein can open for its own po-
tentiality of Being-towards-death as well as for its own guilt. 
"Opening for his own potentiality of existence'' means Dasein lets its 
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own self act in the way of "inner action." This charact$i'.izes the ex-
istential structure of the authentic potentiality-for-Being, which is 
essentially connected with the "running forward in decision" to death 
conceived only in its ontological possibility. It does not aim at 
bringing something real into one's control, but approaches it in its 
potentiality most closely. 
The term "resolve" means ontologically to bring Daeein into po-
' 
tentiality of In-Being in advance of itself. Thie attitude lets Dasein 
unveil itself in and for its Being as pote'ntiali ty in advance of itself. 
Especially, this "running forward in decision .. to the potentiality of 
death makes it truly possible as such and makes the Dasein free for it. 
By such running forward in decision, one's own and innermost extreme 
potentiality of In-Being can be understood of authentic existence. The 
nrunning forward in decision" makes Dasein authentic with the future. 
' 
Heidegger's view of truth is not the expression of correct pro-
positions formulated by the human intellectual faculty. Truth is ra-
ther the openness of what is. "To open something," according to Hei-
degger» means "to make something lignt, free and open. 1169 For instance, 
to ppen the forest in the mountain is to set the place free from the 
trees. The openness is the clearing. How much the forest is open is 
a measure a.a how much the place is set free. .The operation of opening 
is the way to live life in the world in order to answer the question of 
Beingo It is necessary for us to be the authentic life, not the un-
authentic way, in its own-most. .Heidegger has mentioned the point: 
"man as a basic state of Dasein,' is the foundatiori for the primordial 
phenomenon of truth.;,7o In other words, Dasein in Heidegger seeks to 
open the truth. For instance, man's speech is the way to respond to 
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the calling of Being. Especially Heidegger slcy's, "the thinker utters 
Being, the poet nameJ what is holy.,,7l For the subject-matter, the 
thinker deals with Being, the poet deals with what is holy. The former 
utters the already opened essence of Being, but the 1.atter names some-
thing concealed yet mysterious in Beingo Both of them deal with Being 
in different wayso It is not hard to understand that "Being and what 
is holy are the one a.!.1,d same in the poet. 11 But Being is also the es-
sence of truth.· And Being functions as the ground of what-is-totality. 
By the above explanations about the virtue of human nature, it is 
possible to figure out what should be done in the world. While Lao-
Tzu has suggested to us what or how to live in the world on the foun-
dation of Tao's principle, Heidegger seems not to suggest anything of 
this sort directlyo But indirectly one can derive such opinion on 
ethics from the relation between the transcendental horizon of human 
existence and truth-discovering. 
The attitudes of Heidegger and Lao-Tzu on the virtue of' human ex-
istence are related to the attributes 0£: Being and Tao. Without under-
standing Being and Ta.o 9 it is not possible to know the nature of virtue. 
I 
The experi~noe of Being and Tao can be represented concretely in the 
wa;y of life. In Lao-Tzu, that is 11 to foHow Tao," in Heidegger it is 
to open the secret of truth. Both refuse the artificial (unauthentic) 
way to live life in the world, and only suggest we live authentically 
or naturally in progress of listening to Being and Tao. 
Because of these views, Heidegger and Lao-Tzu have been called 
types of Nihilists. Is that right? 
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Nothingness and Nihilism 
In this section we will answer the question of whether Heidegger 
and Lao-Tzu are nihilists. It will also become clear why I have chosen 
to explore the notion of Nothingness. 
Heidegger and Lao-Tzu may be called thinkers of Nihilis~. They 
have dealt with so called, negative termss 11naturality without action," 
"non-artificial," 11nothing1 1.1 in Lao-Tzu, and "anxiety," "death," "au-
thenticity," "nothing 9",in Heidegger. Most of these terminological 
expressions give us a dark, not a bright impression. But if Heidegger 
and Lao-Tzu have been called nihilists because of terminological condi-
tions9 they must be again re-examined because the essentiai contents of 
their philosophies were not opened to (or discovered by) people. For 
instance, love does more than just cover the hurt heart of another 
person; it also criticizes constructively another person's mistakes. 
The Christian 8 s God is not only for punishment but also for everlasting 
love capable of forgiving a person's sin through faithful confession. 
The Oriental attitude is never considered negative by the Orient 
itselfo It is aiways the reunification of something of lower value 
with something of greater reality and higher value. The non-artificial 
attitude to life in Lao-Tzu does not refuse our life, but gets to the 
universality of our life. Lao-Tzu's attitude does not emphasize this 
world. That is why» if "positive attitude" refers to the acceptance of 
life in this world, to make life as satisfactory as possible, then the 
Oriental attitude, especially in Lao-Tzu 1 s case, m~ probably be called 
"negative.n On the above criteria, Taoism m;zy be considered negative 
ethical theory. However, whoever considers Lao-Tzu as a nihilist must 
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be requested to observe again Lao-Tzu's philosophy. Lao-Tzu's philoso-
phy searches for ulitmate peace or quietud&t not temporal self-realize,-
tion. By ultimate peace he means ultim~te salvation, which involves 
the loss of all individuality and of all differences and distinctions 
between subject and object. Salvation here is attainable only by dis-
carding, through any degree of renunciation necessar,y, all that is dif-
ferentiated. Though the general tendency in Taoism is in the direc-
tion of negativism, it is not a~philosophy of non-dynamic inaction or 
nothingness. Taoism is rather a philosophy of "simple living," a nega-
' 
tion only of striving, extravagance, and artificiality. Man as a per-
son feels difficulty in negating his desire. To negate one's desire 
does not mean to abandon one 9 e desires. To negate is to overcome all 
of man's artificial desires or to control t~em. As already explained, 
therefore, in essence Lao-Tzu advises one not to live fully but long 
and contentedlyo He urges tha~ the beet life is one of contentment 
and that the best means to this end is to avoid or control anything 
that can bring discontent. 
In the West people have attempted to follow moral perfectionism in 
their attitude of living fully, or in self-realization in the sense of 
the full actualization of one 0 s potentialities. Livipg fully is the 
ideal. The attitude of sacrificing fullness of life for mere content-
ment is not completely unknown in the Westo But it is not in the main-
stream of Western philosophy. When it occasionally has arisen, it has 
been rejected. In other words, to live fully instead of considering 
a life of contentment becomes nihilism. To this problem, Heidegger 
has the solution. 
According to Heidegger, if the primary understanding of Being is 
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lost, the true understanding of the essence of man and things would 
be again lost. Generally speaking, most of us think of human and 
things in respect to their relation t? a subjecto I~ respect to a sub-
' 
ject, things are objects. Beings as objects in the sense of differen..: 
tiation can only be thougp.t of by forgetting Being itself. Such a 
philosophical attitude, according to Heidegger, becomes nihilism. When 
there is no Being of beings, that is really nihilism. Heidegger says, 
•oethey reject the qUestion of being and treat being like a 
nothing (nihil) which in a certain sense it is, insofar as 
it has an essence. To for~et being and cultivate only the 
essent--that is Nih~lism.7 
11Forgetting11 easily means 11 to take on the appearance of mere neglect, 
of a lack1 of something disagreeable. 11 73 People 1 s unconcern'for Being 
is that which Heidegger understands to be the true nihilism. Nothing-
. ness is never just a neglected something. "Nothing" is more original 
than the Not and negation.74 Negation, strictly speaking, presupposes 
Nothingneseh Nothingness is real and belongs to the event of Being. 
So Heidegger 1 s investigation of Be'ing shows that to be opposed to beings 
is not to be nothing in the sense of. &hil. Nothing is the character 
of totality as what-is-total. Nevertheless~ the reason why "Nothing;-
ness'' has been misunderstood as nihil is because "it conceals itself•-" ?5 
The secret of hidden treasure is not the same as the absence of the 
treasure o Heidegger says that the concealment of the still unrevealed 
being "preserves untouched treasures and is the promise of a find which 
is only waiting for the proper search. 1176 In order to get the. trea-
sure, we need "to open or discover the secret. In other words, the ex-
perience of Nothingness always occurs in the neighborhood of Being 
itself. The concealment of·Being as lacking a meaning of Being is the 
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first step toward the truth of Beinge This step toward the truth. of 
Being "can be realized, not simply by a rejection of nihilism, but by 
an attempt to reach and penetrate its essenceo 1177 The road leading to 
the essence of nihilism, not only helps to overcome nihilism, but also 
brings us back to Being.78 
There' are some aspects. of Lao-Tzu I s opinion which can be signifi-
cant for the Heideggerian. They agree with each other on the rejection 
of any view that places ultimate value upon the individual as such. In 
all there is a higher principle. Tao and Being as Nothingness are the 
universal principle of all things, the essence of reality. They gob~ 
yond finite particularity; ,they cannot be defined. Tao is primarily 
the Way, the essential or underlying law or principle of reality. The 
ideal in Taoism is conformity with the law of reality, whether that be 
interpreted as a purely natural law or as a supernatural principle. 
Each thing conforms to the universal Tao, and in this way, the universe 
runs smoothly. It is a philosophy of the harmon,y of things with each 
other and_of all things with Nature or with the inner principle of Na-
tures Practically speaking, this ma;y be opposed to any philosophy of 
competition or the effort to expand one-self beyond the natural limits 
of one 0 s natureo 
To follow Tao 9 to "fit in with'' the Way, will lead to peace as 
well as to accomplishment and happiness, but the important fact is that 
Tao is the essence of reality~that is why men should "follow Taoo 11 
But also in Heidegger, when Being, as bringing itself into openness, 
is disclosure 9 the disclosedness of Being can be possible in such a 
way that he (Dasein) may come to experience Being in Nothingness. 79 
Therefore man belongs to the openness of Being essentially and 
Being defines itself by living toward human essence. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Regardless of geographical boundaries, as long as there are human 
beings, everyone in the world has a common question to answer: what 
is man really? No-tan people have an answer capab~e of satisfying 
the philosophical question. And in some sense, different answers to 
the question can be given depending on the methodology employed. 
I attempted to indicatep in the first chapter, the gap of philo-
sophical dialogue between East and West by indicating differences of 
methodology. It has been said that there is a deep barrier in philo-
sophical thinking between the two areas. To take away such a gap, I 
chose to analyze the notion of Nothingness. In this essay, the notion 
of Nothingnes,s has been presented not only to answer the above philo-
sophical question (what a man really is) but also to bridge the gap 
of philosophical dialogue between East and West by means of a compari-
son of Heidegger and Lao-Tzu. 
In order to reveal the whole aim of Heidegger's thinking as well 
as Lao-Tzu 0 s, I have brought the sense of Being into focus. Heidegger 
The Being of entities 'is' not itself an entity. If we are 
to understand the problem of Being, our first philosophical 
step consists in not •• o defining enti ties 9 ••• as if Being .· 




The nameless wa.s the beginning of heaven and earth; the named 
was the mother of the m;yriad creatures. J ••• These two are 
the same but diverge in name as they issue forth. (~ ~ 
Ching, Ch. I.) 
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These two passages show the same point to us: how the sense of Being 
can be characterized. Heidegger does not attempt to define Being ,.con-
cretely. He says, "the Being ••• is not itself an entity." The first 
philosophical step in Heidegger i.1;1 not to define Being as so and so. 
Lao-Tzu tJ,ses also the negative form for Tao: "The nameless was the be-
ginning of••••" From the beginning of their philosophies, the notion 
of negation has been introduced to explain Being and Tao. The notion 
' ' 
of annihilation (Nothingness) plays t:tie role of a guide-light to search 
out Being and Tao. In Heidegger and Lao-Tzu, Being (Tao) is the source 
of and the actual Being of entities. 
To elucidate the meaning of Being, H~idegger attempts to open the 
~orizon for Being itself. The horizon is a window to unveil Being. 
' ' 
Through the horizon, it is possible to understand Being. What is the 
; I 'I 
hor,~zon? The horizon'is nasein itself. 
' 
In the second chapter, I in-
dioated that understanding of Being would be accompl~shed in communica-
tion between Dasein and Be'ing. Th~s communication in Heidegger is 
philosophy. Dasein as the horizon for B~ing can pe called a me~hod· 
(the phenomenological way) to describe Being. 
' 
' 
In other words, it is only possible to unveil Being through a mode 
of Being. The mode of Being in Heidegger is a human existence .. (Dasein) 
because of the oharact.eristics of Dase in' s concern. Dase in can be said 
to be rooted in Being. The term "existence" shows us something hidden 
in a human being. "Existence" is that which "stands out from." But 
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what is the something £!:2!!l which a human being stands out? It cannot 
be defined so and soo It is "something holy" behind a. human being. 
The wccy- of understandi!,18 the "something holy" is the phenomenological 
experience of Nothingness. Through this historical (Oeschid~te)vacuum 
I . , .. 
of a human being, Da.sein becomes authentic and then enters into Being 
which is something holy. 
On the other hand, to elucidate the meaning of Tao, Lao-Tzu was 
presented as carefully observing the universe. Rather than a social 
order and an active life, an individual life and tranquility has been 
ooncentratedonin Lao-Tzu's philos~phy. Even though a definite method 
has not been presented for understanding Tao, Lao-Tzu suggests to us to 
learn something from the appearance of the universe. In Lao-Tzu, the 
appearance of the universe shows to us the attributes of Tao: ,for in-
stance, water occupies places which people detest, bu.t it benefits the 
myriad creatures without asking any demand. Nobody has ever heard that 
water is boasting its higher benefits, but nobody can forget the debt 
of gra U tude we owe it. Water seems to have nothing to do. Female 
stands for weak and sof.t. But the soft mother has been known to be 
the strongest of allo Water or female, on the surface, seems to be 
natur.ality without actions but it has the powerful strength • .Again, 
. i 
the mother does not boast her love to the child. But withoutexp~rienc-
ing the mother 9s love, it is impossible to understand the mother. To 
have communication with thos.e powers of the universe is necessary in 
Oriental society. 
As indicated several times through the thesis, Nothingness in 
Heidegger andLao-Tzu is not simply empty. Both philosophers hold to 
the holiness (mystery) of Nothingness as full of itself. 
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To find the holiness ,of Noth~'Ss, I have attempted, in the 1. 
third chapter, to explain ·the characteristics of Dasein •. Dasein, dif-
ferent from non-human existence can ask about the existence of entities 
as,well as himselfo 'D¥'ough asking (concern), the worldh~od ~f Dasein 
has b~en established. To explain this worldhood, I have presented 
three terms "e~istence, 11 "world," and "in. 11 In Heidegger, a human ex-
istence has been marked by three existentials: the state of mind, 
understanding, and discourse (language). Especially, Heidegger's view 
on language is peculiar. Language is the,ho,use of Being. Language is 
like a world to open Being. In order to understand Dasein as the hori-
zon for Being, I have also attempted to,analyze the existence.structure 
of Dasein: facticity, thrownness, Dasein's projection, authenticity 
and inauthenticity. To open Being is to unvdil the ma~ :of Being wtii:o'h 
is,the mode of Being, through observing or analyzing the phenomena of 
I 
I 
Dasein. This means to bring-eamething hidden to light. In other words, 
to uncover the mask of Being and to "l~ bare" :th~ Dasein's own-most 
being ist in truth, to uncover the attributes of Being. To 111~ bare" 
I 
the Dasein°s own-most being is to negate Dasein's inauthenticity.· The 
negation is a step to. becoming authentic thr.pUgh making Dasein' s in-
authentioi ty nuli. This annihilation is not for its own sake, but for 
the sake of becoming authentic. The process of negating the iriauthen-
I 
tic oharact~risticl!I of Da.sein is necessary_ t9 find, the meai:iing of 
Da.sein by observing Dasein. The concrete observatio_n of Dasein brings 
something hidden ~o·light through 1:l:he p:tocess of Nothingness. In Lao-
. -~,, .. l 
Tzu's philosophy, the nature of Tao and Te has also been expressed. 
Even though Lao-Tzu did not formulate e:ny- definite philosophic method, 
he has told us what to do or how to live. The understanding of Tao 
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is possible irt unification with Tao through the experience of Tao. To 
support the experience of Tao, I have presented some ways: intuition 
and quietude, naturality without action, void (empty mind)o Tao ex-
ists beyond the perception. Empty mind is a way to experience Tao. 
That is to say, Lao-Tzu refuses an artificiality of' the intellectual 
skills The universe moves in accordance to naturality without action. 
In order.to open Tao, a human being ha.a to live his life following the 
attributes of Tao. Lao-Tzu says in phaptez: 47 of ~ ~ Ching, "Ther&-
fore the sage knows without going about, understands without seeing, 
And accomplishes without a.n;y action." That is to say, through the in-
ternal .intuition, it is poss~ble to know Tao. But the more a human 
being goes externally, the less one knows Tao. Lao:..Tzu does not seem· 
to analyze exisrtence like Heidegger, but Lao-Tzu has told us to have 
unification with the universe. The u.n~fication with Tao is the world 
beyond the distinction between good ari,4 evil, beauty and ugly, based 
on artificial intellectual efforts. 
In the sense that a human being is deeply related to Being or Tao, 
the question of Nothingness is required beyond the traditional meta-
physical scope and its logic. Nothingness is not a category for the 
differentiation between being, non-being, and 'mano The concept of 
Nothingness includes all the terms. 
In the fourth chapter, I have explai?!,ed the notion of Nothingness 
beyond traditional metaphysics ~d its logic. Meta-metaphysics over-
coming traditional metaphysics was presented. Nothingness was. dealt 
with as the ground for the principle of sufficient reason in Heidegger, 
and as the essence or origin of the universe in Lao-Tzu. From the 
ground of the universe, Nothingness can be discovered in the. process 
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of the universe. In Heidegger, Nothingness is not a counter-concept of 
Being, but "functioning"·in Being, and in Lao-Tzu the appearance of 
the universe is the same as Taop and the difference is only the name. 
Because Nothingness in Heidegger is the ground of opening truth, (au-
thenticity), I ~ried to explain the relation between Nothingness and 
the essence of virtue. In Lao-Tzu, the self-realization of the human 
being becomes unification with Tao through intuition and quietude, 
naturality without action. 
In the last part of the fourth chapter,, I tried to explain the 
problem of Nothingness and nihilism. This part explains my fundamental 
purpose in writing on the notion of Nothingness. The character of 
Nihilism has been given to us in Heidegger as 11 in the forgottenness 
of Being, by only being occupied with the beings, lies nihilism." 
Nihilism does not come from the relation between object and subject, 
but from the ground of forgetting Being beyond the object and the 
subject. That is why Nothingness is not simply an undet~rmined op-
posite to beings. It reveals itself as pertaining to the Being of 
beings. How does Nothingness pertain to Being of beings? Nothingness 
is not a counter-conception to Being bµt "functioning" in Being. No-
thingness is a gateway to show the t 1real" attributes of Being. No-
thingness belongs to Being as its accessible edge. Nothingness in the 
ontological sense hat:! relation 1to Being, but they have different names. 
The answer to the question of Nothingness contains also the g~tto . . -· . 
enquire into the significance of all.the beings in i.lie world. 
Nevertheless, my attempt to derive philosophical enlightenment 
from Heidegger and Lao-Tzu is severely handicapped by the fact that 
their writings are not easy·to understand. Their views have been 
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expressed in peculiar terminology. The terminology has been formu-
lated in the existential experience of Dasein rather than through logi-
cal analysis. Lao-Tzu presents the terms 11 empty mind, 11 11 the naturality 
without action, 11 and 11 the mysterious female, 11 ••• and Heidegger can be 
said to establish his own terminology (ex. Being-in-the-world). These 
terms mean the world of actual experience in man rather than artificial 
concepts to be used in analysis. If we want to answer to the question 
of Nothingness, the simple rational approach to the question must be 
surrendered to a more o~iginal type of unification than logic oan pro-
vide. That is the ontological experience of Nothingness. Through the 
experience of Nothingness, Being itself can ultimately be illuminated 
in Lao-Tzu and Heideggero 
In Lao-Tzuvs philosophy, the surrender and limitation of the ra-
tional faculty is emphasized, and whosoever wants to analyze logically 
the philosophical questions, whatever they are, cannot understand Lao-
Tzu•s philosophy. Lao-Tzu seems to handle negatively the concrete 
occurrences of mental activity by ruling out the rational faculty in a 
man. But he did not assert simply a going beyond the world by reject-
ing completely the factual events. Rather than by logical analysis, 
the method of knowing can be found in the experience of Tao. In Lao-
Tzu9s philosophy, the only way to know the secret of Tao is to "always 
rid oneself of desires in order to observe its secrets. 11 The expres-
sion 11The nameless was- the beginning of heaven and earth11 ( Ch. l) 
stands for the always existing-situation of Tao as the origin of the 
universe. This always existing-situation of Tao explains also the con-
dition of a human mind capable of knowing Tao. Since Tao exists in 
Nothingness (the nameless), a human mind has to be empty (always rid 
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of desire). But "the opposing phrase "always allow yourself to have 
desires in order ·to observe its manifestations" expresses the distinc-
tion between subject and object. Only by this distinction is it possi-
ble to know the manifestation of the named. The manifestation of the 
named characterizes the appearance of the human mind. It means to 
name good or bad, beautiful or uglr, etc. In other words, the ap-
pearance of the.mirid'is not the way to know Tao. But Tao cannot be 
known without its appearance. "Always rid oneself of desires" (No-
thingness) is a gateway to let a man know Tao. 
In Heidegger, the method of ~owing is fo1md in admitting the 
limited situation of a human existence," because nobody knows the Abso-
lute beyond time. The ontological interpretation of a human being 
enables us to find the meaning of Being. In order to disclose the 
essence and the ground for the human existence, Heidegger asserts its 
relation with Being. Heidegger's philosophy seems to reveal the true 
' 
nature of the human existence in relationship to Being. In other words, 
Being can be disclosed through human existence. It would seem that Be-
ing emerges. and beoomes.~ea.1: or ie essentialized through the existence, 
but at the same time Being .:is obscured. Being and human existence are 
distinct but interdependent. The essence of Dasein is existence. Why 
does Heidegger say that Dasein· is existence? Heidegger does not ag~ee 
that the essence of Dasein is found in relatio~ with God (a religious 
sense). What is essential for Dasein is existence. What does exis-
tence mean? It means literally "stands-out-from." O~ning the essence 
of Dasein means to analyze phenomenologically the existential~struoture 
of Dasein. Especially the structure of Dasein's facticity (it is and 
has to be in the world) is part of t!he.discicbsure, of, ontoiogi~l:··an:xciety 
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towards the hidden background. 
Anxiety is the basic mood and reveals to Dasein his radical fini-
tude--Being unto death. Anxiety is not fear, being afraid of this or 
that definite object, but the uncanny feeling of being afraid of noth~ 
ing at all. What is dreaded in anxiety is entirely indefinite. The 
object of anxiety is wholly undefined. It is nothing in particular. 
It cannot be approached from any direction because it is already there 
and yet no-where. This anxiety discloses to man that he is not at 
home (nicht ~ Hause) in the world. Through this anxiety, Dasein dis-
closes to himself the inauthenticity of Dasein and seeks a ground of 
his Being. In Heidegger, anxiety to Nothingness in particular dis-
closes the ground of what-is. 
Therefore, Heidegger attempts to transcend to Being by elucidating 
the world of Dasein. It can be said that he reinterprets the meaning 
of the worldhood of Dasein through transcending into Being. Lao-Tzu 
elucidates the worldhood of human existence on the presupposition of 
unification with Tao. Lao-Tzu tells us to understand a new meaning of 
human existence through the experience of Tao. 
Heidegger and Lao-Tzu have denied the superiority of reason. 
Through the existential transcendence into Being, Being begins coming 
out through the veil of Nothingness. Nothingness has been identified 
with Being pehind the veil. Nothingness is not pure logical negation 
or empty~ but Other to what-is-totality. What does it mean that Noth-
ingness can be considered a "veil" of Being? Whoever wants to see the 
real face behind a veil i has to open the veil by using his hands. To 
show the "real" face it is necessary to work to open the veil rather 
than do a logical analysis of how to open the veil. To look at the veil 
itself or to analyze logically whether the face exists or not makes 
the other person wander in the vacuum. 
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What is needed to do is to touch the veil and to take it off in 
order to see the "real" face. This is the experience of Nothingness. 
Through the experience of Nothingness, it is possible to know the 
attributes of Being and Tao as we can really see the face by opening 
the veil. In o~ening the veil, a human existence expresses himself as 
a person who is already related to Being itself. At this moment, the 
purity of existence as well as the true relation of existence to the 
world can be found. 
In order to experience Being and Tao, Heidegger and Lao-Tzu re-
commend a "listening to the voice of Being." As F. Heineman says in 
the book, Existentialism.~ ~ Modern Pred~cament, a man is not simply 
a thinking self, or an existing individual, but also "a responding 
self." What does man respond to? To Being and Tao through transcen-
dence into Nothingness. 
The voice of Being has been expressed in language which contains 
or houses Being. The language stores the truth of Being, but also 
consists of the foundation which can determine the essence of a man. 
The forgetting of Being is the same as the state of "language-fall." 
The loss of language is poetically expressed as homelessness. Being 
is the home in which a man dwells or lives. Because a man forgets 
Being, the world unfortunately becomes strangely unfamiliar to us, or 
a non-home town. 
Therefore, in order to restore a true human existence, we must 
recover our home from homelessness. This is one of my answers to the 
question which might be raised in this thes:i:s: why I wanted to deal 
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with the notion of "Nothingness.". I wanted to indicate that the notion 
of Nothingness is not simply a negative term. This is the way through 
which a man can be brought to a self-restoration from a self-loss. I 
think that future philosophy will have to go beyond concepts to a 
genuinely creative interrogation of Being in relation to man. 
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